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Counseling, Consulting, and Consent: Abortion 
and the Doctor-Patient Relationship 
Mary Anne Wood* and W. Cole Durham, Jr. ** 
The landmark holdings of the United States Supreme Court 
liberalizing access to abortion have placed special emphasis on 
the doctor's role in helping a woman decide whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy. Roe v. Wade1 envisioned the abortion 
decision as being made by the woman in consultation with her 
attending physician.* Doe v. Bolton3 held that the interests in 
female autonomy and fetal life were adequately safeguarded by 
the woman's initial consultation with her physician, and that 
statutory provisions requiring independent medical review were 
uncon~titutional.~ Most recently, in Colautti v. Franklin, "he 
Court again emphasized "the central role of the physician, both 
in consulting with the woman about whether or not to have an 
abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried 
out. "" 
The emphasis on the doctor-patient relationship in these and 
other abortion cases7 is no accident. The Supreme Court, like 
courts and legislatures in many other parts of the world during 
the 1970's, has been grappling with the problem of striking a more 
sensitive balance between female automony and fetal life than 
that achieved by restrictive nineteenth century abortion legisla- 
tion.# By leaving the abortion decision to the expectant mother 
and her physician, the Court reasoned that it could eliminate 
restraints on abortion not rationally related to the mother's 
health or to legitimate state interests while interposing the re- 
* Assistant Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer- 
sity. B.A., 1966, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1976, National Law Center, George 
Washington University. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer- 
sity. A.B., 1972, Harvard University; J.D., 1975, Harvard Law School. 
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. Id. a t  153. 
3. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
4. Id. a t  195-200. 
5. 47 U.S.L.W. 4094 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979). 
6. Id. a t  4096. 
7. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64, 71 (1976); Connecticut v. Men- 
illo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-98 (1973). 
8. See C. TIETZE & M. MURSTEIN, INDUCED ABORTION: 1975 F A ~ O O K  7 (Population 
Council Reports on PopulatiodFamily Planning No. 14, 2d ed. 1975). 
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strained and balanced judgment of the medical profession in the 
decisionmaking process. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opin- 
ion in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton9 underscores the signifi- 
cance of the medical profession's role in this regard. He emphati- 
cally rejected the contention that the Court in Roe and Doe had 
legitimated abortion on demand, noting that such a view over- 
looks the reality that "the vast majority of physicians observe the 
standards of their profession, and act only on the basis of care- 
fully deliberated medical judgments relating to life and health."1° 
The Court's conclusion that physicians are able to piay a 
mediating role in preventing the woman's expanded autonomy 
from taking an undue toll in fetal life is based on a stereotyped 
picture of the doctor-patient relationship. The Court envisions 
the woman and her doctor counseling together to carefully con- 
sider the variety of factors relevant to her abortion deci- 
sion-including possible medical complications, psychological 
harm, and potential impact on her life, family, and future.ll After 
such consultation, the doctor exercises his best medical judgment 
about whether the abortion should be performed, and the woman 
presumably defers. This concept of the doctor-patient relation- 
ship recurs as a premise in subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
on abortion.I2 
Unfortunately, the vision conjured up by the Supreme Court 
is not the reality in today's abortion practice. At least six out of 
ten abortions performed in the United States are performed in 
freestanding abortion clinics.13 Doctors in such clinics typically 
have a direct financial interest in seeing that abortions are per- 
formed as rapidly and efficiently as possible.14 Frequently, the 
only time the doctor sees the patient is when she is on the operat- 
ing table awaiting the procedure? 
- - 
9. 410 U.S. 113, 207-08 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
10. Id. at 207-08. 
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
12. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 47 U.S.L.W. 4094, 4096-97 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979); 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
13. Sullivan, Tietze, & Dryfoos, Legal Abortion in the United States 1975-1976, 9 
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 116, 127 (1977). The percentage of abortions performed in clinics 
may be even higher now, as the number of clinics is growing while the number of hospitals 
performing abortions is declining. Id. at 126-27. 
14. See, e.g., Auerback, Abortions: Now It's Big Business, in Hearing on S.J. Res. 
119 and S.J. Res. I30 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1976); Connor, Liberal Abortion Law 
Proves to Be a Bonanza for New York Doctors-Critics Hit "Profiteering, " or Is It Free 
Enterprise? Referral Agencies Scored, in id. at 470. 
15. See Goldsmith, Early Abortion in a Family Planning Clinic, 6 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPEC~VE~ 119 (1974); Klaus, A Medical Cop-out?, 133 AM. 68 (1975). 
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Even assuming there is some sort of doctor-patient consulta- 
tion, much can and has been said in criticism of the Supreme 
Court's peculiar reliance on the doctor-patient relationship as an 
approach to resolving the abortion controversy. In light of the 
woman's freedom to select her own doctor, the protection this 
solution provides for developing life may be de minimus as a 
practical matter. Moreover, medical expertise does not carry with 
it moral authority, and therefore the justification for making the 
medical profession the ultimate arbiter of the abortion decision 
is difficult to see.l%t least some women may mistake a doctor's 
judgment for moral approbation and derive unwarranted moral 
solace from a clinical opinion. In addition, allocation of a deci- 
sionmaking role to the doctor may reinforce a paternalistic 
doctor-patient relationship. Yet, barring a constitutional amend- 
ment, the Court's approach is here to stay. 
The Court's careful insistence on doctor involvement in the 
abortion decisionmaking process can be taken in two ways. First, 
it can simply be dismissed as so much legal claptrap cluttering 
up a clear constitutional endorsement of unfettered female auton- 
omy. This has been the dominant approach. If the significance of 
the Court's insistence on doctor involvement in the abortion 
choice is recognized at  all, the tendency has been to render lip 
service to this aspect of the Court's decision, catalogue the fail- 
ings of this approach, and then blithely assume that for all practi- 
cal purposes, Roe u. Wade and its progeny repose the abortion 
choice entirely in the hands of the woman, at least during the first 
trimester. l7 
The aim of this Article is to suggest the plausibility and 
possible ramifications of a second approach-one that takes seri- 
ously the Court's insistence on doctor involvement in the abortion 
decisionmaking process. Despite its imperfections as a response 
to the abortion dilemma, the requirement of doctor involvement 
has the merit of holding open one of the few remaining legal 
channels through which sensitivity to the value of potential life 
may be manifested during the early stages of pregnancy. However 
cynical one may be about the efficacy of medical judgment as a 
safeguard for potential life and about the moral omnicompetence 
of the medical profession, one must remember that unfettered 
16. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles 
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HAW. L. REV. 1, 37 (1973). 
17. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,450-51 & note (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(apparently interpreting the "joint autonomy" of physician and patient as right of individ- 
ual women to be free from governmental intrusion in making reproductive choices); L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN C O N ~ O N A L  LAW933 (1978). 
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abortion on demand provides an even lower level of protection for 
the value of fetal life. And in fairness to the holdings in Roe v. 
Wade and its progeny, reliance on medical judgment may have 
reflected not so much a naive effort to submit an intractable 
moral problem to a scientific oracle as a practical determination 
that no other figure could be interposed in the abortion decision- 
making process with such minimal invasion of the woman's pri- 
vacy right. After all, the Court may have reasoned, the doctor is 
someone the woman must approach about her decision in any 
event if she is to have a medically safe abortion, and injecting 
some concern for both maternal health and potential life at the 
stage of doctor-patient consultation can hardly be said to be an 
unreasonable intrusion into the woman's private life. Viewed in 
this light, the Court's reliance on the medical profession emerges 
as an insightful recognition of the need for a highly individualized 
evaluation of specific abortion decisions and as an approach that 
may be, at least in certain circumstances, extremely sensitive to 
the value of incipient life. 
Since the Supreme Court apparently viewed the doctor- 
patient relationship as a way of injecting such sensitivity into the 
abortion choice, a question arises concerning the extent to which 
states can enact measures that seek to actualize the doctor- 
patient mythology on which Roe and its progeny have been prem- 
ised. Analysis of this question will first require an examination of 
the critical components of the doctor-patient relationship as envi- 
sioned by the Supreme Court in its principal abortion decisions, 
and second, an assessment of a variety of measures aimed at  
shoring up the doctor-patient relationship in an effort to differen- 
tiate permissible "myth actualization" from impermissible state 
regulation of the abortion decision. 
What emerges from this analysis is the recognition that, in a 
variety of contexts, a woman's autonomy with respect to the abor- 
tion choice is actually expanded rather than contracted by impos- 
ing a demand for stronger doctor-patient interaction. And, impor- 
tantly, greater sensitivity for unborn life is often a concomitant 
of expanded autonomy. A woman's autonomy, after all, is pro- 
tected not by ensuring her the ability to make any choice she 
wishes, but by protecting her right to make an informed, calm, 
and rational choice.18 Thus, while a principal concern of this Arti- 
18. The classic formulation of the notion of autonomy as rational freedom is, of 
course, Kant's. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MOW 98-100,108,114- 
16 (H. Paton trans. 1964). For a more current articulation of this Kantian idea, see J. 
Etrwrs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 515-16 (1971). 
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cle is to identify practical steps that can be taken to help stem 
the rising tide of fetal deaths within the framework of existing 
constitutional adjudication, the Article is not "antichoice" in its 
orientation. On the contrary, its aim is to show that a more care- 
ful appraisal of Supreme Court abortion decisions suggests a t  
least some areas in which permissible state action may encourage 
greater sensitivity to fetal life in the very process of enhancing 
female autonomy. 
A. Three Models of Doctor-Patient Privacy 
Despite the Supreme Court's recurrent emphasis on the sig- 
nificance of the doctor-patient relationship in the abortion con- 
text, actual indications of the views held by different Justices 
concerning the nature of the relationship are relatively sparse. 
For the most part, the Court has simply contented itself with 
language evoking vague images of sensitive individualized con- 
sultation, and differing ideas about doctor-patient interaction 
have been papered over in the process.   one the less, at least three 
distinguishable concepts of the relationship are discernible 
among Supreme Court Justices. These views are intimately 
linked to varying concepts of the constitutional right of privacy, 
and the full significance of the emerging view of the doctor- 
patient relationship cannot be appreciated until these privacy 
concepts are analyzed. 
Scholars have long recognized that the constitutional right of 
privacy is a convenient label for a number of related but distin- 
guishable rights and values.19 Writing for the majority in Whalen 
v. Roe,2o Justice Stevens identified two types of interests princi- 
pally at issue where the doctor-patient relationship is involved: 
"One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making 
certain kinds of important de~isions."~~ Particularly since Roe, 
the emphasis in this area has been on autonomy.22 In Carey v. 
19. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 886-89; Gentry, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. 
C.R.X.L.L. REV. 233 (1977); Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHILOSOPHY 
& PUB. AFF. 26 (1976); Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. Am. 295 
(1975); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 
CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976); Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. 
L. REV. 1161 (1974). 
20. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
21. Id. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted). 
22. See, e:g., Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 
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Population Services International, * the Court explicitly de- 
scribed the protections afforded by earlier privacy cases in terms 
of the value of individual autonomy.24 
To speak of privacy in terms of autonomy, however, is to 
speak ambiguously, since the term "autonomy" can be under- 
stood in two significantly different ways. According to one view, 
autonomy can be understood as the right to unfettered self- 
determination-the right to set one's own course and make one's 
own choices regardless of the content of those choices, subject 
only to the obligation of according equal respect to the self- 
determination rights of others. This concept of autonomy has 
been identified in the works of John Stuart Mill25 and has antece- 
dents in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes." It lies a t  the founda- 
tion of much of modern libertariani~rn.~ The opposing concept of 
autonomy stresses rational choice. As formulated by John Rawls, 
people are acting autonomously when "they are acting from prin- 
ciples that they would acknowledge under conditions that best 
express their nature as free and equal rational beings."28 Accord- 
ing to this view not every choice expresses a person's autonomy, 
but only those that are made in the absence of distorting factors 
that prevent the choice from reflecting a person's authentic indi- 
viduality. 
The distinction between these two concepts of autonomy is 
a profound but the distinction can be described here only 
in rough, intuitive terms. The important point for present pur- 
poses is that much of the current controversy among Supreme 
- -- 
1161, 1166 (1974). 
23. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
24. Id. at 687. 
25. See, e.g., H. AMEN, REASON AND CONDUCT: NEW BEARINGS IN MORAL PHIU)SOPHY 
306-07 (1962); Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 117 (R. Wasserstrom 
ed. 1971). For supporting passages in Mill's own works, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT see J. MILL, ON LIBERTY, 65-77, 114-31 (1910). The precise 
nature of Mill's concept of liberty is not altogether clear. Rawls finds in Mill's defense of 
liberty an argument for the value of rational choice. J. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 209-10. 
To the extent this reading is accurate, Mill's notion of liberty conforms more closely to 
autonomy in the sense of rational choice than in the sense of sheer self-determination. 
26. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 126-28 (C. Macpherson ed. 1968) (Hobbes defines 
deliberation as the alternation of appetites and aversions, and rejects the scholastic defini- 
tion of deliberation as "Rational Appetite"). 
27. See, e.g., J. HOSPERS, LIBERTARUNISM 10,49-60 (1971); A. RAND, ATLAS HRUGGED 
(1957); M. ROTHBAND, FOR A NEW L~BERTY 104-30 (1973). 
28. J. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 515. 
29. In some senses, the distinction reflects one of the great divides in Western philoso- 
phy. See R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 2-3 (1963). It lies at the root, for example, of 
Unger's contrast between moralities of reason and moralities of desire-a contrast de- 
signed to describe the two dominant styles of moral theory in the West. See R. UNGER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 49-51 (1975). 
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Court Justices as to the scope of the privacy right is rooted in an 
argument about which form of autonomy should ultimately pre- 
vail. 
To summarize, then, there are a t  least three interests argua- 
bly safeguarded by the constitutional right of privacy: (1) avoid- 
ing disclosure of personal matters, (2) autonomy in the sense of 
unfettered self-determination, and (3) autonomy in the sense of 
rational choice. As one examines Supreme Court discussions of 
the doctor-patient relationship, one detects three corresponding 
models of that relationship. 
The first model of the doctor-patient relationship could be 
characterized as the confidentiality model. It is clearly linked to 
the nondisclosure value. This model is perhaps best represented 
by Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Roe u. Wade and Doe 
u. B ~ l t o n . ~ @  Although Justice Douglas alludes to a number of au- 
tonomy interests protected by the fourteenth amendment,31 his 
central concern seems to be protecting the confidentiality of the 
doctor-patient relationship. "The right of privacy," he states, 
"has no more conspicuous place than in the physician-patient 
relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent relations hi^."^^ 
Under this model, the woman's privacy right is invaded as soon 
as she is compelled to disclose intimate facts about her reproduc- 
tive life to an outside doctor or, for that matter, to anyone she has 
not chosen to tell. According to Justice Douglas, such compulsory 
disclosure constitutes "a total destruction of the right of privacy 
between physician and patient and the intimacy of relation which 
that  entail^."^ While this aspect of the privacy right is significant 
and may account in part for the prominence given the doctor- 
patient relationship in many of the abortion decisions, it is con- 
siderably less significant to privacy analysis than the autonomy 
concerns. The struggle over rival concepts of autonomy is the 
locus of much of the Court's current controversy concerning the 
scope of a woman's right to an abortion. 
A second model of the doctor-patient relationship could be 
characterized as the medical expert model. Because of its linkage 
with the unfettered self-determination concept of autonomy, this 
model takes a rather narrow view of the doctor's role. The doctor 
is viewed as a medical specialist who apprises the woman of clini- 
cal facts bearing on her decision and then ultimately implements 
30. 410 U.S. at 209-21 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
31. Id. at 211-15. 
32. Id. at 219. 
33. Id. 
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whatever course of action she selects. The doctor's posture is 
completely neutral and value free: the moral component of the 
abortion choice is left exclusively to the woman. This model of the 
doctor-patient relationship is most clearly articulated by Justice 
Brennan in Carey v. Population Services I n t e r n a t i ~ n a l . ~ ~  Al- 
though the Court's concern in Carey is with the role of a physician 
in controlling a minor's access to contraceptives, and not in regu- 
lating the abortion decision, Justice Brennan's statements never- 
theless shed considerable light on his view of the doctor-patient 
relationship. Commenting on Doe u. Bolton, he states that the 
Court there 
doubted that physicians would allow their moral "predilections 
on extramarital sex" to interfere with their medical judgments 
concerning abortions. Here, however, no medical judgment is 
involved at all; the State purports to commission physicians to 
engage in moral counseling that can reflect little other than 
their private views on the morality of premarital sex among the 
young.z5 
He then suggests that the reason the doctor-patient relationship 
is emphasized in the abortion cases and not in the earlier contra- 
ceptive cases is that' "the abortion decision necessarily involves a 
medical judgment, . . . while the decision to use a nonhazardous 
contraceptive does not."36 Of course, Brennan's analysis of the 
difference between the abortion and contraceptive cases conven- 
iently overlooks the fact that the latter do not involve the issue 
of unborn life-a probable reason for the emphasis on the doctor- 
patient relationship in the abortion cases. It seems clear, how- 
ever, that Brennads view of the doctor's role is a narrowly clinical 
one. The only reason the woman's privacy right does not exclude 
even her consulting physician from the abortion decision is that 
abortion, if nothing more, is still a medical procedure. 
This narrow view of the medical role dovetails naturally with 
a broad view of the nature of the abortion right. Dissenting in the 
Maher case, which was handed down two weeks after Carey, 
Brennan was sharply critical of the Court's holding that states 
funding normal childbirth need not fund nontherapeutic abor- 
tions. In his view, the prior cases had recognized "an area of 
34. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court in Carey. 
However, Part IV of his opinion was joined by only three other Justices. Justice White 
concurred in the result of that section of the opinion. 
35. Id. at 699 n.24 (emphasis in original) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196 
(1973)). 
36. Id. at 699-700 n.25. 
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privacy invulnerable to the State's intrusion surround[ing] the 
decision of a pregnant woman whether or not to carry her preg- 
nancy to term?' He viewed state measures that altered the in- 
centive structure surrounding the abortion choice as "an obvious 
impairment of the fundamental right established by Roe v. 
Wade. "3g This uncompromising interpretation of the woman's 
right to an abortion shows Justice Brennan's commitment to the 
value of autonomy in the sense of unfettered self-determination. 
If the woman's right to self-determination is the ultimate value, 
the doctork role is naturally constricted; he serves merely as the 
instrument of her will. 
The third model of the doctor-patient relationship could be 
described as the medical counselor model. This is the model be- 
hind the Supreme Court's doctor-patient mythology, and it is 
founded on the rational choice concept of autonomy. Under this 
model, the consulting physician performs the tasks of the doctor 
as medical expert, but additionally assumes a larger interper- 
sonal responsibility. The physician ensures that the woman is in 
a position not only to rationally assess the narrow medical issues, 
but also to evaluate carefully the nonmedical aspects of abortion. 
I t  is this highly personalized role the Court initially had in mind 
when it stressed that "medical judgment may be exercised in the 
light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, 
and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient."" 
Since medical considerations alone will rarely dictate the 
outcome of the abortion choice,40 the Supreme Court's stress on 
the doctor-patient relationship is naturally interpreted as an im- 
plicit reference to the desirability of the medical counselor model. 
Indeed, a state may have a strong interest in encouraging rela- 
tionships of the medical counselor rather than the medical expert 
variety. Given the state's legitimate (if noncompelling) interest 
in encouraging normal childbirth during the first two trime~ters,~' 
the state may be anxious to encourage a woman's full considera- 
tion of all factors that might lead her to continue her pregnancy. 
Although severe constraints have been imposed on the state's 
authority to restrict abortions, the state may nonetheless wish to 
maximize the probability that women will choose to continue 
37. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 484 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. at 484-85. 
39. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). 
40. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 922 n.22 (1973) (quoting Stone, Abortion and the Supreme Court, MOD. MED., April 
30, 1973, at 32, 36). 
41. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977). 
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their pregnancies. Of course, the attending physician is not the 
only person capable of helping the woman fully to consider the 
alternatives to abortion.42 But the Supreme Court's progressive 
insulation of the doctor-patient relationship has raised doubts 
concerning the appropriateness of legislation compelling consult- 
ation with other  individual^.^^ Efforts to implement the medical 
counselor model may accordingly be the only remaining alterna- 
tive for providing a woman with the information necessary to a 
rational abortion decision. 
Even disregarding the concern for unborn life, the argument 
can be made that the concept of autonomy as rational choice 
should be preferred to that of autonomy as unfettered self- 
determination. The Supreme Court's careful refusal to establish 
a constitutional right to abortion on demand is undoubtedly the 
clearest indicator that the value of rational choice, rather than 
that of self-determination in itself, lies at the core of the constitu- 
tional right of privacy. Reinforcing this view is the Court's hold- 
ing in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth that informed consent 
requirements are permissible because they help assure that the 
woman's abortion choice is "made with full knowledge of its na- 
ture and  consequence^."^^ The doctor-patient relationship falls 
within the penumbra of the privacy right because it maximizes 
the woman's rational choice autonomy. What the Court has 
sought to protect is not any decision the woman happens to make, 
regardless of the extent to which it is a reflection of emotional 
stress and possibly inadequate information. On the contrary, the 
Court has tried to promote careful decisions, conscientiously 
made after consideration of all the facts and alternatives. 
There are, of course, problems with the notion of allowing the 
state to determine when an individual decision is sufficiently 
rational to be immune from state review.45 This is unlikely to 
42. An appropriately trained social worker, for example, might be able to perform this 
service with greater competence and with lower fees. 
43. See notes 87-89, 284-90 and accompanying text infra. 
44. 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). 
45. At bottom, the difficulty is the one common to so-called real-will theories. As 
Jeffrie Murphy phrases the objection, "Surely we want to avoid cramming indignities 
down the throats of people with the offhand observation that, no matter how much they 
scream, they are really rationally willing every bit of it. It  would be particularly ironic for 
such arbitrary repression to come under the mask of respecting autonomy." Murphy, 
Marxism and Retribution, 2 F'IULOSOPHY & PUB. Am. 217, 230 (1973). For criticism of real- 
will theories, see I. BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); 
Dworkin, supra note 25, a t  119. 
As both Murphy and Dworkin recognize, albeit for different reasons, state constraints 
that respect only rational choices, as opposed to arbitrary personal desires, may make 
sense under appropriate circumstances. See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 119-26; Murphy, 
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become a problem in the abortion setting, however, as constitu- 
tional norms preclude the creation of previability veto rights over 
the woman's ultimate Legislation designed to inform 
and sensitize without predetermining decisional outcomes can do 
nothing but expand female autonomy. Increased information 
may make the abortion choice more difficult, but this is not be- 
cause the woman is being pressured to do something against her 
will. Rather, it is because the woman is led to feel the responsibil- 
ity for her decision more keenly. Only those sympathetic to the 
arguments of Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor4' would perceive 
this burden as an incursion on autonomy. In any event, when one 
adds concern for unborn life into the equation, the argument in 
the abortion context for protecting the woman's autonomy in the 
sense of rational rather than arbitrary choice seems overpowering. 
B. Components of the Doctor-Patient Relationship 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the rational choice ver- 
sion of autonomy and the associated medical counselor model of 
the doctor-patient relationship are emerging as dominant con- 
cepts in the Supreme Court's abortion cases. Assuming this anal- 
ysis is accurate, it becomes vital to identify those features of the 
doctor-patient relationship that are either expressly considered or 
impliedly mandated by the Court's emerging view. Clearly, mea- 
sures aimed at  reinforcing these aspects of the doctor-patient 
relationship are the ones most likely to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. 
1. Screening 
One obvious component of the doctor-patient relationship 
contemplated by the Supreme Court is thorough patient screen- 
ing.VI'he Court has always stressed that medical judgment 
should be "exercised in the light of all factors . . . relevant to the 
well-being of the patient."49 The Court's willingness to sustain 
recordkeeping and reporting procedures in Danforth6' and its at- 
supra at 238-43. So long as the state's efforts are limited to providing information to the 
woman considering abortion, and are not permitted to determine the result of the process, 
the dangers ascribed to more extreme real-will theories do not apply. 
46. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69, 74 (1976). 
47. F. DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 292-314 (C. Garnett trans. 1950). 
48. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). See generally Butler & Fujita, 
Abortion Screening and Counseling: A Brief Guideline for Physicians, 50 POSTGRADUATE 
MED. 208, 208 (1971). 
49. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U S .  at 192. 
50. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U S .  52, 79-81 (1976). 
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tention in Doe v. Bolton to the possibility that a physician might 
consult with another doctor in a "doubtful situation" or when the 
"medical decision is a delicate one"51 provide additional evidence 
of the Court's concern for information that might be yielded by 
screening. The variety of factors to be considered by the doctor 
in the exercise of his or her medical judgment presupposes that 
the doctor will thoroughly assess the patient's individual needs. 
The Court's concerns are linked to practical demands for 
thorough patient screening. Among other things, the fact of preg- 
nancy itself needs to be established; the number of "abortions" 
which have been performed on nonpregnant women is extremely 
disconcertingP2 More generally, a woman's overall health and 
medical history may have great impact on the relative safety of 
continued pregnancy or abortion." Equally significant is the need 
to screen the patient to identify pertinent psychological and so- 
ciological characteristics. Recent studies indicate that many 
women contemplating abortion have apprehensions, unresolved 
conflicts, or feelings of ambivalence regarding abortion." Women 
from strict religious or moral backgrounds or women with pre- 
vious histories of emotional instability have a particularly great 
tendency to develop psychological complications following abor- 
tion? If the doctor is to exercise his best medical judgment, he 
must have a thorough knowledge of the woman's psychological 
and emotional traits. 
Family background must also be dealt with by both doctor 
and patient? Both must evaluate the family's capacity to deal 
with the realities of pregnancy and additional offspring. The feel- 
ings of the woman's family and partner about abortion may have 
a profound impact on her own ability to deal with the a b o r t i ~ n , ~  
and this impact must therefore be considered. 
51. 410 U.S. at 199. 
52. "An estimated 20 to 30.percent of criminal abortions have been done on nonpreg- 
nant women." Butler & Fujita, supra note 48, at 208. 
53. See, e.g., DEP'T OF MEDICINE & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON U ~ m m  
MEDICAL CENTER, SERIES F, POPULATION REPORTS 69-70 (1976). 
54. Bracken, Psychosomatic Aspects of Abortion: Implications for Counseling, 19 J. 
R E P R O D U ~ V E  MED. 265 (1977); Nadelson, Abortion Counselling: Focus on Adolescent 
Pregnancy, 54 PEDIATRICS 765, 767 (1974); West & Walsh, The Need for Pre-Abortion 
Counseling-Now More Than Ever, 59 NEB. MED. J. 34 (1974). 
55. See Belsey, Greer, Lal, Lewis, & Beard, Predictive Factors in Emotional Response 
to Abortion: King's Termination Study-IV, 11 SOC. S a .  & MED. 71,80-81(1977); Osofsky 
& Osofsky, The Psychological Reaction of Patients to Legalized Abortion, 42 AM. J .  
ORTHOPSYCH. 48, 58 (1972); West & Walsh, supra note 54, at 35. 
56. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973); Belsey, Greer, Lal, Lewis, & Beard, 
supra note 55, at 266. 
57. Belsey, Greer, Lal, Lewis, & Beard, supra note 55, at 80-81; Bracken, supra note 
54, at 266. 
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2. Informing the patient as to the nature and consequences of 
the procedure 
Another component of the relationship contemplated by the 
Supreme Court is the responsibility of the doctor to inform the 
patient of the facts she needs to make her own decision. In 
Danforth the Supreme Court acknowledged that the decision to 
abort is a stressful one and that "it is desirable and imperative 
that it  be made with full knowledge of its nature and conse- 
quences."" In so holding, the Supreme Court recognized that a 
woman's right to choose to have an abortion is an empty one if it 
is not accompanied by sufficient information to help her make 
that choice an intelligent and informed one. The doctor may be 
the only individual in a position to help protect the woman's 
autonomy in this manner, since he or she may be the only person 
who is both qualified to provide her the needed information and 
aware that she is contemplating an abortion. 
The woman deciding whether or not to have an abortion 
vitally needs information in several particular areas. She needs 
to understand the facts of female reproduction and fetal develop- 
ment. These are critical to her understanding of the abortion 
procedure itself. Accurate understanding of fetal development 
may bear directly on whether a woman will choose to have an 
abortion and may also have a significant impact on her mental 
health after having one.5@ A woman may choose not to end a 
pregnancy if she learns that a fetus as few as eight weeks old is a 
minature human being rather than a blob of p ro topla~m,~  or if 
she learns that the fetus she is carrying is just a few weeks from 
viability. Some women have reported experiencing severe mental 
distress as a result of learning the facts of fetal development after 
obtaining an ab~rtion.~'  
As any other medical patient, a woman contemplating abor- 
tion needs information about the procedure to be performed on 
her and possible complications of that procedure." A variety of 
58. 428 U.S. a t  67. 
59. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 6 2648, 6 2649 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1978) (testimony of 
Sen. Helms concerning § 2614); Letter from James E. Scoresby to Arizona House of 
Representatives in support of Arizona House bill 2193 (Mar. 25, 1978) (on file with the 
Brigham Young University Law Review). 
60. Life Before Birth 10, reprinted from LIFE, Apr. 30, 1965 (Educational Reprint No. 
27). 
61. See authorities cited note 59 supra. 
62. The need for medical patients to know about the treatment they are to receive is 
the basis for the tort concept of informed consent, which stems from the ancient law of 
battery. Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767). The concept has developed 
to include disclosure of the nature of the procedure to be performed, and information 
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abortion procedures can be used at each stage of the pregnancy." 
Women who are contemplating an abortion need to understand 
the procedure the doctor will employ. A woman who knows what 
to expect during the procedure will experience less anxiety.64 In 
abortions during later stages of pregnancy, women should be in- 
formed of the possibility of the fetus being born alive. Women 
who have late abortions for reasons other than not wanting the 
child have a special interest in learning which procedure will most 
likely end the pregnancy without necessarily killing the fetus. 
While it is relatively easy to provide a woman with a descrip- 
tion of the abortion procedure, it is more difficult to give helpful 
concerning risks and alternatives to the procedure. Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy 
Tale? Law 's Vision, 39 U. Prm. L. REV. 137, 146-48 (1978). The cause of action for medicai 
malpractice based on failure to obtain informed consent became commonly recognized as 
an action for negligence. Plant, The Decline of "Informed Consent," 35 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 91, 92 (1978). Two different standards of care evolved. The earlier and currently 
majority view involves application of a "professional standard," requiring physicians to 
disclose the information that a "reasonable and prudent medical doctor of the same school 
of practice as the defendant under similar circumstances" would disclose. Natanson v. 
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (1960). Courts, however, have increasingly 
adopted a "full disclosure" standard, requiring the physician to disclose "all material risks 
inherent in the proposed treatment." Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent 
Cases in "Full-Disclosure" Jurisdictions, 14 Due. L. REV. 309, 310 (1976). The standard 
is based on a patient's right to self-determination and is a standard "set by law for 
physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves." 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
Theoretically, a standard "set by law" would diminish the need for expert testimony in 
informed consent litigation; however, that diminution may be insignificant if expert testi- 
mony is needed to "identify and elucidate for the factfinder the risks of therapy and the 
consequences of leaving existing maladies untreated." Id. a t  791-92. 
63. This is particularly true of abortions performed after the first trimester. Most 
abortions before 12 weeks' gestation are performed either by dilation and curettage or by 
vacuum aspiration. DEP'T OF MEDICINE & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON U IVERSITY 
MEDICAL CENTER, SERIES F, POPULATION REPORTS 10 (1973). In either case, the cervix is 
dilated and the contents of the uterus are either scraped or vacuumed out. In the first 
trimester of pregnancy, the obvious result will be destruction of the fetus. These methods 
may be used for periods up to 14 weeks of gestation. Id. at 28; C. TIETZE & M. MURSTEIN, 
supra note 8, at 44. 
After the first trimester, abortions can be performed by saline amniocentesis, in which 
some of the amniotic fluid is removed from the uterus and replaced with a salt solution. 
Usually the fetus dies and labor begins. DEP'T OF MEDICINE & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON U IVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, SERIES F, POPULATION REPORTS 68 (1975). Pros- 
taglandin is also used to stimulate the onset of labor. Prostaglandin may be placed in the 
amniotic sac as in saline amniocentesis or it may be inserted vaginally. Id. at 72-76. 
Hysterotomy, another method of post-first-trimester abortion, is like a miniature caesa- 
rean section. An incision is made in the abdomen and the fetus is removed. Id. a t  67. 
Rarely will the fetus survive an abortion performed by saline amniocentesis, but occasion- 
ally it does. Id. at 68. Prostaglandins or hysterotomy are somewhat more likely to produce 
a live fetus. Id. at 67, 76. There are numerous other methods of performing abortions that 
are not commonly used in the United States. Id. a t  67. 
64. Bracken, supra note 54, at 266; Nadelson, supra note 54, at 769. 
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information about abortion complications. The incidence and 
severity of possible complications varies with the procedure used, 
the stage of pregnancy, and the woman's overall health." With 
the extent of today's research, however, it is surprisingly difficult 
to estimate the risk of complications in the abortion process. 
Although recent studies in the United States indicate that the 
risk of complications is decreasing as doctors develop greater ex- 
perience in performing  abortion^,^^ the fact remains that we have 
a brief history in the United States of free access to abortion, and 
the studies that have been done are not extensive? Moreover, it 
is difficult to counter the argument that since most abortions are 
performed in abortion clinics," we may not be getting an accurate 
idea of the number of complications stemming from abortion. A 
woman who receives an abortion in a clinic may not return to that 
clinic if she is experiencing complications; she may be more likely 
to go to her family doctor or to the emergency room of a hospital. 
This difficulty is cbmpounded by the fact that many women 
65. Generally, the possible physical complications of abortion include allergic re- 
sponse to anesthesia, excessive blood loss, hypertension, fever, infection, retained prod- 
ucts of conception, cervical and uterine injuries, a possible tendency toward miscarriages 
or premature births in later pregnancies, and Rh immunization. DEP'T OF MEDICINE &
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON U IVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, SERIES F, POPULATION 
REPORTS 31-36 (1973). Post-first-trimester abortions include the possibility of more severe 
and perhaps life-threatening complications, especially in women with preexisting disor- 
ders such as sickle cell anemia, other moderate or severe anemia, cardiac or cardiovascular 
disorders, or renal disorders. DEP'T OF MEDICINE & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, SERIES F, POPULATION R E P O ~ S  69-70 (1976). The incidence 
of morbidity and mortality stemming from abortion increases dramatically after the first 
trimester. Id. at  65. 
In addition to these potential physical complications, there may be emotional or 
mental complications stemming from abortion, particularly for women who come from 
strict religious or moral backgrounds, Osofsky & Osofsky, supra note 55, a t  58; West & 
Walsh, supra note 54, at 35, who already suffer from a degree of mental or emotional 
instability, Belsey, Greer, Lal, Lewis, & Beard, supra note 55, a t  81, or who are under age 
18, Bracken, Phil, Hachomovitch, & Grossman, The Decision to Abort and Psychological 
Sequelae, 158 J .  NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 154, 155 (1974); Goldsmith, Gabrielson, 
Gabrielson, Mathews, & Potts, Teenagers, Sex, and Contraception, 4 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPECTIVES 32, 35 (1972); Nadelson, supra note 54, a t  766. 
66. C. ~ E T Z E  & M. MURSTEIN, supra note 8, at  52-53. 
67. Id. at  51. Of course, we cannot afford to ignore the studies of complications of 
abortion conducted in other countries with longer histories of free access to abortion than 
our country. Hayasaka, Toda, Zimmerman, Ueno, & Ishizaki, Japan's 22 Year Experience 
With a Liberal Abortion Law, in Hearing on S. J. Res. I19 and S. J. Res. 130 Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 661, 667 (1976). The complications noted in these studies, such as sterility 
or increased premature births in later pregnancies, may not appear until years after the 
abortion or until the woman has had more than one abortion. Id.; Schwartz, The Impact 
of Voluntary Abortion on American Obstetrics and Gynecology, 42 MT. SINAI J. MED., 
N.Y. 468, 473 (1975). 
68. See note 13 supra. 
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travel outside their own communities to obtain abortions, in part 
because those providing abortions are often concentrated in one 
or two metropolitan areas in a state," and in part because women 
seeking abortions may wish to minimize the risk that anyone in 
their own community would learn about the abortion. Until effec- 
tive followup methods are developed, it may be some time before 
accurate statistics on abortion complications are available. 
Because of the difficulty of estimating the likelihood of abor- 
tion complications, some may argue that informing a woman in 
detail about a great variety of improbable but possible complica- 
tions will not influence her decision whether or not to have an 
abortion, but may make her unnecessarily fearful about the pro- 
cedure.'O However, the trend is for patients to prefer greater spe- 
cificity on the part of the physician in outlining the risks asso- 
ciated with a particular operation? For example, a study of pa- 
tient reactions to "straightforward and perhaps even harsh" in- 
formation concerning the possible complications of angiography 
showed the information was welcomed by patients and did not 
appear to make them more fearful of the pr~cedure.'~ There is no 
reason to think patient reaction in the abortion context would be 
appreciably different. Most women would prefer to make a deci- 
sion autonomously-with complete information-rather than 
leave the decision to a paternalistic physician attempting to 
"protect" her from preoperation anxiety. 
3. Consideration of alternatives 
A woman's awareness of various possible answers to a prob- 
lem pregnancy is also critical to her decisionmaking process. A 
frequently publicized HEW study concluded that there were no 
alternatives to abortion except suicide, motherhood, and mad- 
nes~ . '~  Obviously such a cynical view will not be helpful to the 
woman facing a problem pregnancy. Women contemplating abor- 
tion for health reasons need information about other medical 
treatments that would permit them to maintain their health 
69. Sullivan, Tietze, & Dryfoos, supra note 13, at 121, 124. 
70. See, e.g., Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation 
of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 124, 132 n.28 (citing Fost, A Surrogate 
System for Informed Consent, 233 J.A.M.A. 800 (1975)). 
71. See Alfidi, Informed Consent: A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 J.A.M.A. 1325 
(1971). 
72. Id. 
73. O'Reilly, Okay, Mr. Califano, Consider the Alteratives to Abortion . . ., MS., 
May 1978, at 74. The study referred to in this article has never been released, and Freedom 
of Information Act requests for information concerning the study have been, at least as of 
this printing, ignored. 
7831 ABORTION COUNSELING 799 
while continuing their pregnancy to term.74 Likewise, women con- 
templating abortion because of marital status, lack of financial 
resources, or inability to care for another child need information 
about available public and private assistance for the pregnant 
~ o m a n . ~ V o m e n  who have such information about alternatives 
will be capable of making more informed decisions. 
4. Conscious exercise of medical judgment 
A somewhat less obvious but equally significant feature of 
the Supreme Court's idealization of the doctor-patient relation- 
ship is its emphasis on the conscious exercise of medical judg- 
ment in the abortion decisionmaking process. That the doctor is 
expected to take an active role in this process is apparent from a 
number of the Court's statements. After cataloguing the factors 
that may bear on the abortion decision, such as medically diag- 
nosable harm, additional offspring, "distressful life and future," 
and psychological harm, the Court in Roe concludes: "All these 
are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily 
will consider in ~onsultation."~~ In summarizing its holding re- 
garding the first trimester of pregnancy, the Court goes so far as 
74. Physicians report that there are few medical indications for abortion: 
"[Mledical advances have made it possible for women with almost any kind of physical 
illness to survive pregnancy and childbirth . . . ." Schwartz, Abortion on Request: The 
Rqychiatric Indications, in ABORTION, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 139, 141 (D. Walbert & J. 
Butler eds. 1973). One physician discusses possible maternal health indications for abor- 
tion as including cardiovascular disease, ulcerative colitis, renal disease, neurological 
disease, tuberculosis, diabetes mellitus, and malignancy. He qualifies the discussion, 
however: "The paucity of recent papers in the medical literature recommending abortion 
for medical disease or even describing the effect of medical diseases on pregnancy . . . 
undoubtedly reflects the infrequency with which medical disease is now thought to indi- 
cate abortion." He concludes that proper management of all but the most severe condi- 
tions could allow a pregnancy to continue to term. Niswander, Abortion Practices in the 
(Jnited States: A Medical Viewpoint. in ASORTION, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 199, 202-06 (D. 
Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973). 
75. Public assistance for abortion alternatives may presently be available on an indi- 
vidual basis in many states through a combination of various benefits from federally 
funded programs such as Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976) (medical assistance 
payments for pregnancy, childbirth, and infant health care assistance); title XX of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 94 1397-1397f (1976) (additional source of assistance for 
pregnancy-related expenses); and title V of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 4 4  701-710 
(1976) (pregnancy counseling, nutritional care, and child health care counseling), with 
state-funded adoption subsidy programs, see, e.g., Katz, Subsidized Adoption in America, 
10 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1976). 
Religious organizations often have established programs for financial support of 
"unwed mothers" or other women with unwanted pregnancies. See, e.g., Searle, Adoption 
Program Aids Mother, Child (1973) (pamphlet, available from the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, Social Services Dep't, Salt Lake City, Utah). 
76. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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to state that "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be 
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending 
phy~ician."~~ The Court here depicts the ultimate abortion deci- 
sion as one that is made not by the consenting woman, but by her 
doctor. This view is further reinforced by the Court's statement 
that during the first trimester "the abortion decision in all its 
aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and 
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an 
individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper 
medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra- 
professional, are a~ai lable ."~~ This language appears to confer 
authority on the physician under appropriate circumstances to 
refuse a woman's request for an abortion if he does not believe the 
circumstances warrant ~ne ,~%nd  to countenance legal and pro- 
fessional sanctions-even in the first trimester-for abuse of the 
"responsibility" of exercising such judgment. As a practical mat- 
ter, the restraining force of a physician's refusal is minimal be- 
cause of the probability in contemporary American society that 
a woman who desires an abortion can find another physician who 
views her situation differently and who is willing to perform an 
abortion at her request?O Nonetheless, the language is significant 
in evidencing the Supreme Court's view that the consulting phy- 
sician is to play a major role in making the abortion decision. 
As noted at the outset,R1 the Court's insistence on the con- 
scious exercise of medical judgment in the abortion decisionmak- 
ing process is rooted in a concern to achieve some sensitivity in 
77. Id. at  164. 
78. Id. at  166 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun's opinion fails to indicate what 
his reference to the "usual remedies" implied. He was possibly thinking of malpractice 
actions as well as formal professional disciplinary proceedings and informal sanctions such 
as loss of the professional regard of one's peers. If the judicial remedies he contemplated 
were limited to malpractice, one could infer-contrary to what we are arguing-that the 
scope of the medical judgment he envisioned was narrowly limited to matters of medical 
or surgical technique. This narrow clinical conception of medical judgment, however, 
seems inconsistent with the larger and more personal consultative role assigned to the 
doctor in other parts of the opinion. 
79. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). But c f .  Note, The Abor- 
tion Alternative and the Patient's Right to Know, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 167, 184 
1 hereinafter cited as Abortion Alternative]. 
80. One of the glaring inconsistencies of Justice Blackmun's opinions for the Court 
in Roe and Doe is that they recognize the "emotional nature of the abortion controversy" 
and "the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians . . . that the subject inspires," 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 116, and yet the opinions assume in a number of passages that 
the doctor-patient relationship will play a significant role in protecting potential life. See. 
e . g ,  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197. As long as the patient is free to select a doctor with 
pro-abortion views, the influence of the medical profession in inhibiting unnecessary abor- 
tions will obviously be weak. 
81. See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra. 
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balancing interests between female autonomy and fetal life. The 
Court apparently reasoned that this end could best be obtained 
by relying on the judgment of the consulting physician. He or she 
would presumably be in a position to evaluate the woman's physi- 
cal, emotional, psychological, and familial needs, and at  the same 
time would be able to give due weight to the value of incipient 
life in reaching the abortion decision. Viewed with the benefit of 
hindsight afforded by Beal v. Doem and Maher v. with their 
recognition of strong and legitimate state interests in fetal life 
throughout p r e g n a n ~ y , ~ ~  the Court's holding in Roe may be inter- 
preted as a determination that during the first trimester suffi- 
cient protection of the relevant state interests is afforded by con- 
sultation with the p h y ~ i c i a n . ~ ~  Accordingly, the Court's conclu- 
sion seems merely to be that the state's interests in maternal 
health and potential life do not become sufficiently compelling to 
warrant overriding the decision reached by the woman and her 
doctor until later stages in pregnancy. 
This conclusion does not imply that concern for fetal life is 
to be totally abandoned during the first trimester. On the con- 
trary, the Court expressly recognized the significance of the doc- 
tor's role in protecting the value of potential life in Doe v. Bolton. 
There, in the course of invalidating first trimester hospital com- 
mittee review procedures, the Court stated, "[wlith regard to 
the protection of potential life, the medical judgment is already 
completed prior to the committee stage, and review by a commit- 
tee once removed from diagnosis is basically r e d ~ n d a n t . " ~ T h e  
Court's insistence on the involvement of the medical profession 
in first trimester abortion decisions thus reflects a considered 
judgment about how the countervailing interests in protecting 
incipient life and preserving a woman's autonomy can be recon- 
ciled during early stages of pregnancy. Reemphasizing the signifi- 
cance of the conscious exercise of medical judgment in abortion 
consultations may accordingly provide the foundation for a more 
sensitive interpretation of the Supreme Court's abortion deci- 
sions. 
82. 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
83. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See notes 94-104 and accompanying text infra. 
84. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 478; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 446. 
85. Justice Powell's statement in Maher that the decision not to require state funding 
of nontherapeutic abortions "signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it," 432 
U.S. at 475, takes on added significance in this context. It implies that earlier interpreta- 
tions of Roe, which read too much into the Court's recognition of a woman's right to obtain 
an abortion and attached too little significance to its concern for potential life, were 
unfounded. 
86. 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) (emphasis added). 
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C. The Current Constitutional Parameters 
In order to evaluate concrete proposals aimed at strengthen- 
ing the doctor-patient relationship, an understanding of the pre- 
cise constitutional limits on state action affecting the abortion 
decision is vital. The major impact of the Court's rulings, of 
course, has been to insulate the doctor-patient reelationship from 
outside influences. Beginning with Roe v. Wade, the Court held 
that, at least during the first trimester, doctor and patient may 
make and implement the abortion choice "without regulation 
[or] . . . interference by the State."n7 Doe v. Bolton went a step 
further by invalidating a scheme that conditioned access to abor- 
tion on hospital committee approval or on concurrence by other 
medical  professional^.^^ Finally, in Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth," the Court invalidated parental and spousal consent 
requirements, thus insulating the doctor-patient decisionmaking 
process from familial vetoes. 
In general, then, the doctor-patient relationship is seen as a 
private affair that should not be subjected to interference from 
the state, the medical profession, or other interested parties in the 
absence of compelling state interests. A distressing side effect of 
this progressive insulation of the doctor-patient relationship in all 
too many cases is the increasing isolation of the pregnant woman 
from a number of the support systems that would normally assist 
her in making an extremely difficult decision. Given the Court's 
recognition of the stressful nature of the abortion choice,9o one 
implication of the recent decisions is that a greater share of the 
emotional burden of making the abortion decision is concentrated 
exclusively in the doctor-patient relationship. This would appear 
to create a demand for heightened sensitivity on the part of the 
consulting physician. 
Consistent with this demand for heightened sensitivity, and 
notwithstanding the strong language in Roe suggesting the abso- 
lute impermissibility of state regulation of the abortion choice 
during the first trimester," the Supreme Court has subsequently 
made it clear that some minimal constraints on the doctor- 
patient relationship are appropriate from the time of conception. 
87. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
88. 410 U.S. 179, 197-200 (1973). 
89. 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976). 
90. Id. at 67. 
91. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). See Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of 
Health, ,505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974) (invalidating regulations establishing sanitation and 
equipment requirements for abortion facilities), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975). 
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States may continue to require that abortions be performed only 
by licensed physicians and may subject persons performing abor- 
tions without such authority to criminal  sanction^.^^ Moreover, 
the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth specifi- 
cally sustained statutory provisions establishing recordkeeping 
and reporting procedures and making the woman's informed con- 
sent a necessary precondition for a lawful ab~r t ion.~"  
The clearest articulation of the scope of permissible state 
action during the first trimester occurs in Maher v. Roe,g4 where 
the Court sustained a state regulation limiting Medicaid benefits 
for first trimester abortions to those that are "medically neces- 
sary." Commenting on prior privacy cases, the Court stated, 
Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an 
abortion" . . . . Rather, the right protects the woman from 
unduly burdensome interference with hsr freedom to decide 
whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on 
the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring 
childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by 
the allocation of public funds.95 
The criminal abartion statutes invalidated by Roe and the 
spousal and parental consent requirements struck down in 
Danforth were thus objectionable not merely because they consti- 
tuted state regulation within a protected zone of privacy, but 
because they were "unduly burdensome interference" with the 
abortion choice. They constituted state-created obstacles to the 
effectuation of the abortion decision independently reached by a 
woman and her consulting p h y ~ i c i a n . ~ ~  The Maher Court ac- 
knowledged that a state's failure to fund nontherapeutic abor- 
tions might make it difficult or even impossible for indigent 
women to obtain abortions.g7 The Court reasoned, however, that 
this lack of access resulted not from affirmative state action but 
from the women's indigency, and that the state had no affirma- 
tive obligation to finance the termination of a potential human 
life.gX The conclusion, then, was that states are free to influence 
92. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975). 
93. 428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976). See Section In infra (discussion of informed consent). 
94. 432 U S .  464 (1977). 
95. Id. at 473-74 (emphasis added). 
96. Id. at 473. Chief Justice Burger formulated this notion by stating that the 
"legislative determination [to finance certain childbirth expenses] places no state- 
created barrier to a woman's choice to procure an abortion . . . ." Id. at 481-82 (Burger, 
C. J., concurring). 
97. Id. at 474. 
98. Id. at 474, 479-80. 
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the abortion choice by shaping incentive structures to accord with 
legitimate state policies, even during the first trimester, so long 
as no affirmative state action unduly interferes with the decision 
to continue or terminate the p r e g n a n ~ y . ~ ~  
In this Article, the concern is not so much with state action 
that  alters the incentive structure surrounding the abortion 
choice as with state action designed simply to shore up the 
doctor-patient relationship and to make certain that a meaning- 
ful relationship emerges. But in both areas the question is much 
the same. At what point does permissible fostering of legitimate 
state interests blur over into impermissible regulation of the abor- 
tion choice? When do regulatory efforts become "unduly burden- 
some interference with [the woman's] freedom to decide whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy?"loO One of the central teach- 
ings of Maher is that wherever that line lies, it cannot be identi- 
fied simply by drawing a magic circle around the woman and her 
doctor and proscribing any law whose influence reaches inside it. 
As one scholar has noted, one cannot simply view "the zone of 
privacy as a legal island of personal autonomy in the midst of a 
sea of public regulation and interaction," because that metaphor 
fails to clarify what constitutes an impermissible "coming 
ashore."'" The virtue of the Court's analysis in Maher is that i t  
recognizes that the issue is one of degree-one of assessing what 
constitutes an "unduly burdensome interferencev-and that in 
the abortion context, this question cannot be answered without 
assessing the significance of the state's interest in potential life. 
While only compelling state interests justify state nullification of 
decisions reached by a woman and her doctor, the state has a 
"strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal child- 
birth"IM which "exists throughout the pregnancy."lM If this sig- 
nificant, though not compelling, interest is sufficiently potent to 
warrant first-trimester regulations that provide strong incentives 
for a decision to continue a pregnancy, as Maher implies, then 
surely requirements designed merely to assure meaningful doctor- 
patient interaction (without prescribing the decisional outcome 
of such interaction) must also be permissible.lo4 
99. Id. at 474-78 & nn.8-10. 
100. Id. at 474. 
101. Gentry, supra note 19, at 271. 
102. Beai v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977). 
103. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977). 
104. A narrower interpretation of Maher that might preclude this conclusion could 
he developed on the basis of Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). which 
was decided just two weeks before Maher. In Carey, the Court invalidated a New York 
statute regulating the sale and distribution of nonprescription contraceptives, holding 
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The first part of this Article has suggested that Supreme 
Court cases dealing with abortion, while drastically limiting the 
range of permissible state regulation of the abortion choice, have 
not altogether precluded state action that encourages heightened 
sensitivity to the value of unborn life. We have argued that al- 
though there is much that can be said in criticism of the Supreme 
Court's attempt to resolve the abortion dilemma by insisting on 
doctor involvement in the abortion decisionmaking process, the 
residual merits of that approach in terms of maintaining some 
respect for the value of fetal life while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility for female autonomy have not been fully appreciated. 
Once one begins to recognize the doctor-patient relationship as a 
vehicle for enhancing the woman's rational autonomy and for 
imposing noncoercive constraints on the decision to terminate 
fetal life, it becomes obvious that there are a number of things a 
that no compelling state interest justified the regulations in question. The Maher majority 
was able to conclude that gtates need not fund nontherapeutic abortions by reasoning that 
a state's decision to withhold funds in this manner impinged on no fundamental interests 
that would require a compelling state interest test. Arguably, the only distinction between 
Maher and Carey with regard to the applicability of a compelling state interest test is that 
(brey involved affirmative state action. Justice Powell, writing for the Maher majority, 
indicated that Maher "signal[ed] no retreat from Roe," 432 U.S. a t  475, and he stressed 
the distinction between direct burdens and nonproffered advantages. See id. at 475 n.9. 
If this analysis is accurate, any regulation imposed on the doctor-patient relationship 
during the first trimester other than legislative refusals to affirmatively support abortion 
decisions through funding or otherwise would require use of the compelling state interest 
test. 
Carey and Maher, however, can be harmonized on a basis that gives broader scope 
to the "unduly burdensome interference" rationale of Maher. Part of the reason for the 
difference between the two cases was that the New York regulatory scheme in Carey was 
not well crafted to meet its apparent ends. As Justice Stevens stated regarding the legisla- 
tion's prohibition of contraceptive sales to minors under age sixteen, "[ilt is as though a 
State decided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety 
helmets." 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring). Even Justice Powell, who maintained 
that the majority erred by invoking the compelling state interest test, concurred in the 
result on the ground that there were no state interests of sufficient magnitude to justify 
the regulations as drafted. See id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring). More significantly, 
Carey merely held that the compelling state interest test comes into play when state 
regulations "burden an individual's right to decide to prevent contraception or terminate 
pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision 
. . . ." Id. at  688 (emphasis added). See id. at  688 n.5. The regulations in question in 
Carey were characterized as imposing "a significant burden on the right of individuals to 
use contraceptives . . . ." Id. at 689 (emphasis added). This language recognizes the 
analysis in Maher that at the boundaries the question of invasion of privacy is inescapably 
a question of degree-a question of "unduly burdensome interference." Carey leaves open 
the possibility that various state measures-even some going beyond mere nonsup- 
port-may be constitutionally permissible. 
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state can do to enhance the efficacy of the doctor-patient relation- 
ship in promoting these ends. Having explored in some detail the 
Court's view of a desirable doctor-patient relationship and having 
noted the Court's apparent willingness in recent cases to permit 
some degree of state activity aimed at  encouraging normal child- 
birth, we are now in a position to analyze the constitutionality of 
a number of concrete approaches designed to ensure that the 
contemplated doctor-patient relationship actually materializes. 
In this Section we will examine clinic regulation and recordkeep- 
ing and reporting procedures as they relate to the consultation 
process. In Section I11 we will turn to informed consent require- 
ments, and in Section IV we will focus on counseling schemes. 
A. Regulation of A bortion Clinics 
A reality serving to undermine the emergence of meaningful 
doctor-patient relationships is the fact that a t  present at  least 
sixty percent of abortions occur in freestanding ~l in ics . '~While  
some of these facilities are equipped not only to terminate preg- 
nancy but also to provide needed counseling and other forms of 
support,'" the general procedure allows the woman minimal con- 
tact with the physician performing the abortion. Typically, the 
clinics are run by entrepreneurs and physicians on a profitmaking 
basis."'7 Maximizing clinic revenue demands minimizing the 
amount of time the doctor spends with each patient, thus treat- 
ing strong disincentives for the development of meaningful 
doctor-patient relationships. Even if time is allocated to careful 
doctor-patient consultation, the financial incentives for the doc- 
tor are all on the side of encouraging the woman to go through 
with the abortion. This is not to imply that medical judgment will 
inevitably be distorted by concern to make one more fee. Still, 
financial considerations are a powerful influence threatening to 
bias the consulting physician in favor of the abortion decision and 
against concern for fetal life.'" A doctor routinely performing 
105. Sullivan, Tietze, & Dryfoos, supra note 13, at 127. 
106. Burnhill, Humane Abortion Services: A Revolution in Human Rights and the 
Ileliuery of a Medical Service, 42 MT. SINN J. MED., N.Y. 431, 436 (1975). 
107. Id. at  434-35. Rut cf. Schwartz, supra note 67, at 475 (arguing in an early article 
that profit margins were likely to decline as clinics proliferated). 
108. Numerous studies have noted the impact of differential financial rewards on 
medical treatment decisions. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 70, at 136-41 & nn.48-70 (and 
authorities cited therein). Studies have also shown that there are a variety of contexts 
where doctor specialization and the likelihood of a noncontiguous doctor-patient relation- 
ship tend to make the attitudes of colleagues more important than patient interest in 
shaping physician behavior. See E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE 199-206 (1970); Schneyer, supra note 70, at 137-38. 
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abortions in a clinic is apt to become desensitized to the magni- 
tude of the abortion choice in the life of an individual woman.log 
Thus, even if such a doctor does take the time to counsel with his 
patient, he is unlikely to play a role conducive to the protection 
of fetal life in the woman's decisionmaking process. 
Because of these considerations, some countries have en- 
acted legislation either disallowing or strictly regulating the per- 
formance of abortions in freestanding  clinic^."^ Under French 
law, for example, a voluntary termination of pregnancy may be 
performed only by a physician in a public hospital or in a private 
hospital meeting certain statutory requirements."' If the number 
of abortions performed in a private hospital exceeds one-quarter 
of all surgical and obstetrical operations performed in any given 
year, the hospital will be closed for one year. A repeat offense will 
entail final closure of the establi~hrnent."~ 
Obviously, this type of statute precludes the emergence of 
freestanding clinics operating as abortion mills. However, it is not 
really clear that it solves the key problems associated with clinics. 
Even in a private French hospital that observed the "one- 
quarter" limitation, it would be quite possible that a relatively 
small number of doctors would perform a high percentage of the 
hospital's abortions. The problem of desensitization that is en- 
countered in an abortion clinic would likely be replicated among 
these doctors. Moreover, the financial incentives tending to cre- 
ate an institutional bias in favor of abortion do not arise solely in 
the clinic setting. Because the great majority of abortions can be 
performed using simple procedures and with relatively low over- 
head costs, it is likely that a hospital's abortion facilities will 
operate in the black and may even provide funds to help support 
research or other hospital programs. Subtle administrative pres- 
109. But see Marcin & Marcin, The Physician's Decision-Making Role in Abortion 
Cases, 1975 JURIST 66,70-71 (describing experience of Dr. Bernard N . Nathanson, who was 
influential in persuading the New York State Assembly to liberalize abortion laws in that 
state and subsequently headed a major abortion clinic, but ultimately became convinced 
that human life exists in the womb); Nathanson, Sounding Board: Deeper Into Abortion, 
291 New ENGLAND J. MED. 1189 (1974). 
110. See, e.g., The Criminal Law Consolidation Ordinance, 1876 to 1969, Ej 79A(3)(h) 
(Austl., Northern Territory) (legal abortions must be performed in hospitals), reprinted 
in 28 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL DIGEST OF HEALTH LEGISLATION 428
(1977) [hereinafter cited as WHO INT'L DIGEST]; Act of June 13, 1975, Law No. 50, Ej 3 
(Nor.) (abortions after twelfth week permitted only in hospitals; earlier abortions may be 
performed in other approved institutions), translated in 26 WHO INT'L DIGEST 595 (1975). 
111. Act of Jan. 17,1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162-2 (Fr.) (concerning the voluntary 
termination of pregnancy), translated in 26 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, at 352 
( 1975). 
112. Id. art. L. 178-1. 
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sures may result in the creation of a pro-abortion setting equiva- 
lent to the one a doctor is likely to experience in the clinic setting. 
Despite these considerations, however, there is greater reason to 
expect medical consultation that is sensitive to the value of po- 
tential life in a multipurpose medical institution than in a clinic 
whose raison d'etre is the performance of abortions. Among other 
things, a hospital staff is likely to have greater diversity of atti- 
tudes tgward abortion than the staff of an abortion clinic, and 
collegial dynamics might help to reduce the predictable pro- 
abortion bias of the clinic setting."" 
While interesting as an approach to limiting abortion pro- 
curement systems peculiarly likely to be insensitive to the value 
of potential life, the French approach would have only limited 
relevance to the contemporary American scene. Doe v. Bolton 
expressly rejected a statutory requirement that all abortions, in- 
cluding first trimester abortions, be performed in licensed and 
accredited  hospital^.^'^ Moreover, Roe v. Wade and Doe u. Bolton 
have been interpreted as placing severe limitations on appropri- 
ate regulation of abortion clinics. Thus, attempts by local govern- 
ments to subject abortion clinics to restrictive zoning have been 
declared unconstitutional.l~~imilarly, blanket measures requir- 
ing that all abortions, including first trimester abortions, be per- 
formed in hospitals or equivalent facilities have been held uncon- 
s t i t~ t iona l .~~Wour t s  have also taken a dim view of schemes im- 
posing regulatory burdens on abortion facilities that are not 
applicable to medical facilities in general.Il7 The most note- 
worthy case in this area is Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. 
Chicago Board of  Health.t1R In that case, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals struck down regulations promulgated by the 
Chicago Board of Health that required abortion clinics to keep 
various types of records, conduct specified tests, maintain equip- 
ment necessary to treat abortion complications, and in general, 
provide facilities that could render a high standard of abortion 
care. Notwithstanding the fact the regulations were clearly 
- 
113. ('f. Schneyer, supra note 70, at 137-38 (noting the impact of organizational 
dynamics and collegial pressure in biasing medical treatment decisions). 
114. 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973). 
115. Planned Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 
1977); Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, - M a s s . ,  367 N.E.2d 606 
(1977). 
116. Arnold v.  Sendak, 416 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Ind.), aff 'd, 429 U.S. 968 (1976). 
117; See, e.g., Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Mobile Women's 
Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Hallmark 
Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D.N.C. 1974). 
118. 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975). 
119. See id. at '1144-45. 
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designed to protect maternal health, the court held that they 
were unconstitutional because the state did not have a compel- 
ling interest in promoting maternal health until the end of the 
first trimester. lZo 
The result in Friendship Medical Center may be criticized on 
several grounds. Most obviously, even though first trimester abor- 
tions are relatively safe, they will clearly be even safer if per- 
formed in facilities equipped to handle foreseeable complications. 
As long as the regulations do not interfere with the right of the 
woman and her doctor to make and implement an informed abor- 
tion decision, such regulations should be allowed. This conclusion 
draws added support from subsequent Supreme Court case law 
suggesting that a state interest need not be compelling in order 
to justify state action that does not unduly burden the abortion 
decision. In the Friendship Medical Center case, the Seventh 
Circuit assumed that the mere presence of the woman's funda- 
mental privacy right was sufficient to require a compelling state 
interest test in the area of clinic regulation.I2l The Supreme 
Court's subsequent decision in Maher u. Roe,lZ2 however, has 
made it clear that legislation designed to foster legitimate state 
interests is not constitutionally objectionable where it does not 
create "unduly burdensome interference with [the woman's] 
freedom to decide."lZ3 Thus, i t  would now appear that the state 
need not meet the compelling state interest test to justify regula- 
tions-even regulations tha t  add an  overlay of requirements 
applicable only to abortion facilities124-unless the regulations 
constitute an excessive restriction of female autonomy. 
Of course, the tougher compelling state interest analysis is 
triggered by a relatively slight burden on a woman's autonomy. 
In Carey u. Population Services International, I 2 l  a statute permit- 
ting only licensed pharmacists to distribute nonprescription con- 
traceptives was held unduly burdensome because i t  
"substantially limit[ed] access to the means of effectuating" 
- ---- 
120. Id. at 1150. 
121. See id. 
122. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
123. Id. at 474. 
124. The "differential regulatory overlay" argument derives much, if not all, of its 
force from the assumption that any differential treatment in the abortion area can only 
he justified by a compelling state interest. See generally Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. 
v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
997 (1975). Justice Powell's conclusion in Maher that a state scheme that funded thera- 
peutic but not nontherapeutic abortions could be sustained "under the less demanding 
test of rationality," 432 U.S. at 478, undercuts this assumption. 
125. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
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reproductive ~h0ices . l~~ Therefore, to the extent clinic regulations 
have the effect of significantly curtailing the availability of abor- 
tion facilities, such regulations will be subject to the compelling 
state interest analysis applied by the Seventh Circuit in 
Friendship Medical Center. But where their effect is merely to 
establish a minimum threshold for the quality of abortion facili- 
ties, regulations rationally related to maternal health should be 
permissible. 
A number of states have passed legislation requiring that 
abortions after the first trimester be performed in hospitals.In 
The Court in Doe v. Bolton alluded to the possibility that after 
the first trimester the state might "adopt standards for licensing 
all facilities where abortions may be performed so long as those 
standards are legitimately related to the objective the state seeks 
to accomplish."128 The Court indicated that the state would be 
required to make a fairly strong showing that the standards were 
necessitated by medical considerations if such regulations were to 
be justified on the basis of the state's compelling interest in ma- 
ternal health.Izg The dicta in Doe v. Bolton militate against the 
constitutionality of a statutory provision precluding clinics with 
sophisticated medical technology from performing second trimes- 
ter abortions. Nonetheless, a plausible argument can be made 
that the added medical risks inherent in abortions during the 
later states of pregnancy, together with the Supreme Court's con- 
cern for a sensitive doctor-patient relationship, would constitu- 
tionally validate a statute requiring that abortions be performed 
in hospitals after the first trimester. 
B. Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements 
The permissibility of limited recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements is one of the few clear exceptions to the constitu- 
tional prohibition against regulation of first trimester abortions. 
The Supreme Court sustained such requirements in Planned Par- 
enthood v. Dunforth,'" but made it clear that the exception was 
a narrow one. Recordkeeping and reporting requirements during 
the first trimester were characterized as "perhaps approaching 
- - 
126. Id. at 688. 
127. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE 4 18-608(2) (Supp. 1978); Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, 8 
4, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 8 81-24 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE ANN. # 35-1-58.5-2(b)(2) 
(Burns 1975); KY. REV. STAT. 4 311.760(2) (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. 4 145.412(2) (West 
Supp. 1979); Mom. REV. CODES ANN. 4 94-5-618(b) (1977). 
128. 410 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1973). 
129. Id. at 195. 
130. 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976). 
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impermissible limits."131 The Court warned against efforts to ex- 
ploit the exception by indirectly imposing, "through the sheer 
burden of recordkeeping detail,"132 constraints that the Court had 
previously held to be unconstitutional. Significantly, as in Maher 
a year later, the ultimate issue was perceived to be whether the 
requirements in question constituted an "unduly burdensome 
interferen~e"'~"ith the woman's abortion decision. The Court 
further limited its holding by stressing that the Missouri statute 
provided that the information gathered "shall be confidential and 
shall be used only for statistical purposes."I" Finally, the Court 
noted the importance of a rational relationship between the infor- 
mation requested and a legitimate state interest. 
In Danforth, the Court rationalized its acceptance of Mis- 
souri's recordkeeping requirements by recognizing the state's 
valid interest in maternal health.13Vecause Roe v .  Wade had 
held that this interest did not become compelling until the second 
trimester, and because Danforth sanctioned first trimester rec- 
ordkeeping requirements, one commentator has discerned in 
Danforth signs of a "circumspect retreat" from the no-regulation 
stance of Roe.'" However, in light of the Court's subsequent as- 
sertion in Maher that validation of some measures affecting first 
.trimester abortion choices "signals no retreat from Roe,"IS7 it 
seems more accurate to state that Roe was not as rigidly antiregu- 
lation as initially supposed. In any event, it is clear the state has 
"strong and legitimate"13R interests in protecting female auton- 
omy and potential life as well as maternal health. All these inter- 
ests can be furthered by reasonable recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements. 
In the long run, such requirements should yield significant 
data facilitating medical judgments, thereby contributing to 
maternal health.'3g However, the immediate impact of record- 
keeping and reporting requirements is to require a minimal level 
of interaction between the doctor and the patient. This increases 
the woman's autonomy by expanding the informational base 
upon which the abortion decision ultimately rests and may well 
alert the woman to facts that would lead her to continue her 
131. Id. at 81. 
Id. 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
428 U.S. at 79, 87. 
Id. at 80-81. 
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 997. 
432 U.S. at 473-75. 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 478; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 446. 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79-81. 
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pregnancy. Because several legitimate state interests support 
recordkeeping requirements,140 there appears to be no reason 
why informational requests could not be tailored to further 
other of these interests in addition to the interest in maternal 
health. Thus, Danforth should not be read as holding that record- 
keeping and reporting procedures are permissible only if they are 
rationally related to the state's maternal health interests. 
As noted, the immediate effect of recordkeeping require- 
ments is to reinforce one of the major features of the Supreme 
Court's view of the doctor-patient relationship: the screening 
function.'" Essentially, recordkeeping requirements promote the 
interests in female autonomy and fetal life by insisting that a 
thorough patient history be obtained. That such requirements 
should turn out to be constitutional is not surprising, considering 
the Supreme Court's insistence in all its major abortion cases on 
doctor involvement in the abortion decision. Because the taking 
of a medical history is an important aspect of the doctor-patient 
relationship mandated by the Court, and because no incremental 
invasion of the woman's privacy occurs if the doctor is simply 
required to report some of the data gleaned in the process, no 
constitutional infraction occurs so long as confidentiality is ade- 
quately safeguarded. 
As more states pass recordkeeping and reporting require- 
ments, difficult line-drawing problems are bound to arise in de- 
termining (1) whether the confidentiality of the data gathered is 
sufficiently protected, (2) whether the information requested is 
unnecessarily intrusive, and (3) whether the requirements taken 
as a whole are overly burdensome. In order to analyze these is- 
sues, it is useful to consider in detail the types of requirements 
and informational requests apt to be encountered. In this regard, 
it will be useful to refer occasionally to a recently enacted Louis- 
iana statuteld2 that, because of its comprehensiveness, raises most 
of the issues likely to arise. 
140. Such alternative interests are not limited to those noted in the text. In Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court sustained a recordkeeping and reporting 
scheme pursuant to which all those distributing or obtaining dangerous drugs by prescrip- 
tion, as well as those prescribing such drugs, were reported to the state health department. 
The Court held that, in view of excellent confidentiality precautions, the privacy rights 
of those challenging the statute were not violated and the overall scheme was constitu- 
tional, since it was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in regulating traffk 
in dangerous drugs. 
141. See notes 48-57 and accompanying text supra. 
142. Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, 44 1299.35.1-.18, 1978 La. Sess. Law 
Serv. 836 (West)(to be codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 4 4  40:1299.35.1-.18 (West)). 
A. An individual abortion report for each abortion performed or induced 
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1.  Confidentiality 
The Louisiana statute deals with the confidentiality issue by 
requiring that the report "shall be confidential and shall not con- 
tain the name of the woman."143 However, the patient is assigned 
a number which is included in the report,ld4 and a copy of the 
abortion report is ultimately made a part of the medical record 
of the patient a t  the facility or hospital in which the abortion was 
performed. 14" 
One of the primary objections to a reporting requirement 
that does not adequately safeguard confidentiality is that the 
patient may be deterred from seeking an abortion if she fears 
other people may hear about the abortion. Thus, at  least one 
court has invalidated recording and reporting provisions that 
- -  
upon a woman shall be completed by her attending physician. The report shall 
he confidential and shall not contain the name of the woman. This report shall 
include: (1) Patient number, (2) Name and address of the abortion facility or 
hospital, (3) Date of abortion, (4) Zip code or residence of pregnant woman, (5) 
Age of pregnant woman, (6) Race, (7) Marital status, (8) Number of previous 
pregnancies, (9) Educational background, (10) Number of living children, (1 1) 
Number of previous induced abortions, (12) Date of last induced abortion, (13) 
Date of last live birth, (14) Method of contraception at  time of conception, (15) 
Date of beginning of last menstrual period, (16) Medical condition of woman at 
time of abortion, (17) Rh type of pregnant woman, (18) Type of abortion proce- 
dure, (19) Complications by type, (20) Type of procedure done after the abor- 
tion, (21) Type of family planning recommended, (22) Type of additional coun- 
seling given, (23) Signature of attending physician, (24) The certifications pro- 
vided for in this Chapter. 
B. An individual complication report for any post-abortion care performed 
upon a woman shall be completed by the physician providing such post-abortion 
care. The report shall include: (1) The date of the abortion. (2) The name and 
address of the abortion facility or hospital where the abortion was performed. 
(3) The nature of the abortion complication diagnosed or treated. 
C. All abortion reports shall be signed by the attending physician and 
submitted to the Department of Health and Human Resources within thirty 
days after the date of the abortion. All complication reports shall be signed by 
the physician providing the post-abortion care and submitted to the Depart- 
ment of Health and Human Resources within thirty days after the date of the 
completion of the post-abortion care. 
D. A copy of the abortion report shall be made a part of the medical record 
of the patient of the facility or hospital in which the abortion was performed. 
E. The Department of Health and Human Resources shall be responsible 
for collecting all abortion reports and complication reports and collating and 
evaluating all data gathered therefrom and shall annually publish a statistical 
report based on such data from abortions performed in the previous calendar 
year. 
Id. Ei 1299.35.10. 
143. Id. 8 1299.35.10(A). 
144. Id. 4 1299.35.1O(A)(l). 
145. Id. 8 1299.35.10(D). 
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called for the identification of the woman by name.lJ6 At the same 
time, an important benefit of reporting requirements is the infor- 
mation such reports could yield about risks to maternal health as 
a result of repeat abortions. If the information is gathered in a 
way that preserves the complete anonymity of the woman, longi- 
tudinal studies that  would identify repeat abortion situations 
would be impossible. 
The Louisiana approach to this dilemma is somewhat of a 
compromise. The woman's name does not appear on the report, 
but a patient number is assigned that makes it possible to iden- 
tify repeat abortions if a second abortion is performed in the same 
institution. A problem with the Louisiana approach is that no 
provision is made for statewide standardization of patient num- 
bers, thereby preventing meaningful longitudinal studies based 
on these reports. The legislature was no doubt reluctant to assign 
women universal abortion numbers permanently linked to their 
names or social security numbers because of the Orwellian aura 
of such a procedure and because it might ultimately make easier 
the disclosure of the name behind the number. 
2. Intrusiveness 
Much of the information requested under the Louisiana stat- 
ute is unexceptionable from the perspective of relative intrusive- 
ness. Patient number, age, name of facility where abortion is 
performed, date of abortion, and the zip code of the pregnant 
are noncontroversial matters that would be expected to 
be included in virtually any recordkeeping procedure. 
Other noncontroversial information that can reasonably be 
requested is information having a clear bearing on the medical 
advisability of abortion in the woman's situation, information 
that would indicate special medical techniques that might need 
to be applied, or information that would record medical compli- 
cations involved in a particular ab0rti0n.l~~ As a general rule, 
information that would normally be requested in the course of 
obtaining a woman's medical history should be subject to reason- 
able reporting requirements. The request for this information in- 
volves no invasion of the woman's privacy beyond that which 
146. Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 255-56, 
342 N.E.2d 501, 504, 513-14, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706, 718-19 (1975). 
147. Nondisclosure of exact address information may of course be significant to pre- 
serving confidentiality. 
148. See, e.g.,  Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, 8 1299.35.10(A)(8), ( l l ) ,  (13), 
(15), (20), 1978 La. Sess. Law Serv. 836 (West)(to be codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 4 
40: l299.35.lO(A)(8), ( l l ) ,  (13), (15), (2O)(West)) (quoted in note 142 supra). 
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would be necessary in any event were she to obtain an abortion. 
These reporting requirements do not in any way operate to dic- 
tate the outcome of the abortion decision in a particular case. 
Other more controversial information relates to the social 
and educational background of the woman.14g Arguably, informa- 
tion of this nature is less relevant to the exercise of a doctor's 
medical judgment. Data such as race, marital status, and number 
of living children are less directly related to the exercise of a 
physician's judgment than the number of previous pregnancies, 
the number of previous abortions, date of the last menstrual pe- 
riod, and the like. A woman's background, however, and the cir- 
cumstances under which she lives may have a significant bearing 
on the potential impact of the abortion choice on her mental 
health.'" Thus, a sensitive physician will be concerned about the 
woman's background and environment in order to better assess 
the wisdom of abortion in her particular circumstances and in 
order to better asses the types of followup assistance or support 
she may need. This information would also be useful in statistical 
studies aimed at  identifying the demographic characteristics of 
women seeking abortions. Although the potential for excessive 
reporting requirements may be of some concern, such require- 
ments should be permissible as long as the information requested 
is relevant to the doctor's exercise of sensitive and informed judg- 
ment about the wisdom of an abortion in light of the totality of 
the woman's circumstances. 
A final category of information relates to the method of con- 
traception, if any, at the time of conception and the type of family 
planning recommended subsequent to an abortion.lJ1 This type of 
reporting requirement appears to be aimed primarily at minimiz- 
ing the number of repeat abortions. Assuming that contraception 
is less risky than abortion, ensuring that a woman has adequate 
information about available contraceptives is obviously related to 
a legitimate interest in her long-range health. 
Although it is not immediately clear how contraception infor- 
mation bears on the abortion actually being performed, such in- 
formation may be useful in determining the extent to which the 
availability of abortion impacts on the use of contraceptives. So 
long as such information imposes no constraints on the ultimate 
decision reached by the woman and her consulting physician, a 
149. See, e.g., id. Ej lB9.35.lO(A)(6), (7), (9), (10). 
1.50. See notes 240, 264-66 and accompanying text infra. 
151. See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, f 1299.35.10(A) (14), (21), 
1978 La. Sess. Law Serv. 836 (West)(to be codified as h. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 
40: 1299.35.lO(A)(l4), (21) (West)) (quoted in note 142 supra). 
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reporting procedure that helps identify the need for contraception 
procedures that could possibly avoid repeat abortions would seem 
to be permissible. 
3. Burdensomeness 
There is no easy way to assess whether specific reporting and 
recordkeeping legislation is overly burdensome. No readily identi- 
fiable standard is available on the basis of which one may dis- 
criminate between legislation demanding too much and legisla- 
tion imposing only a reasonable burden. The Danforth decision 
itself provides little guidance. The statute involved in Danforth 
calledfor the preparation of reporting forms by the Missouri Divi- 
sion of Health, but because the Court gave no indication of what 
was on such forms (presumably because the constitutionality of 
the statute was challenged before the forms were prepared), there 
is no way to gauge the burdensomeness of the reporting require- 
ments approved in Danforth. While certain factors bearing on the 
burdensomeness issue come to mind-the length of the report 
required, the extent to which the reporting procedures call for 
information beyond a normal medical history, the likelihood that 
the burden of preparing the report itself would bias a doctor's 
judgment as to the appropriateness of an abortion-the burden- 
someness issue is one that must ultimately be decided on a case- 
by-case basis. The Louisiana statute is quite rigorous in its re- 
porting requirements, but arguably is not overly burdensome. 
It is still too early to predict with precision how extensive a 
recordkeeping and reporting requirement is permissible under 
Danforth. However, the allowance of the reporting requirement in 
Danforth is additional evidence of the Supreme Court's concern 
for the existence of a meaningful doctor-patient relationship in 
the abortion context. Hopefully, the information Danforth allows 
to be gathered will be put to meaningful use. As indicated earlier, 
there is language in Danforth praising the Missouri statute on the 
ground that the data gathered would be used "only for statistical 
This "statistical purpose" restriction should be con- 
strued broadly to allow meaningful analysis of the data gathered 
so that medical knowledge may be advanced and society placed 
in a better position to grapple with the problem of abortion. 
One of the more interesting statutory recordkeeping provi- 
sions in Europe is one that has been adopted in Czechoslovakia. 
Not only does Czechoslovakian law require the collection of sta- 
152. 428 U.S. at 79, 81. 
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tistical abortion data, the law also demands that district and 
regional abortion commissions use the data in analyzing on an 
annual basis the factors that cause women to seek abortions. It 
is hoped the reports will place various governmental agencies in 
a better position to take practical steps toward eliminating a t  
least some of the factors leading women to seek abortions.lS A 
statutory provision of this nature would appear to be wholly con- 
sistent with both Roe and Danforth and would help to heighten 
sensitivity to the value of unborn life. A recordkeeping and re- 
porting procedure akin to the Czechoslovakian statute would thus 
provide another avenue for improving, within the constitutional 
framework delineated by the Supreme Court, both the meaning- 
fulness of doctor-patient interaction and the sensitivity of the 
abortion decisionmaking process to the interest in fetal life. 
A. Types of Informed Consent Provisions 
For the most part, Planned Parenthood v. D ~ n f o r t h ' ~ ~  will be 
remembered as a decision that narrowed the range of permissible 
state intervention in the abortion decision. The Court's accep- 
tance of recordkeeping and reporting procedures is like a quiet 
backwater in a more dominant current, paralleled in direction 
only by its decision to sustain Missouri's informed consent stat- 
ute. But reverse currents should not be ignored. The recognition 
by the Danforth Court of the appropriateness of informed consent 
requirements is particularly significant. 
Statutes and case law requiring a woman's consent prior to 
the performance of an abortion constitute an important regula- 
tion of the doctor-patient relationship and one clearly aimed at  
protecting the woman's autonomy. Several states have passed 
informed consent legislation, l" and the conventional common law 
notion that consent is a prerequisite to nonliability for battery 
would presumably apply el~ewhere.~~Vocusing o  informed con- 
sent statutes, considerable variation is discernible among state 
153. Order of May 16, 1973, No. 71, 13 (Czech.), translated i n  25 WHO INT'L DIGEST, 
supra note 110, at 75 (1974). 
154. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
155. IDAHO CODE $ 8  18-608 to -609 (Supp. 1978); Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23(2) (Smith-Hurd 1977); KY. REV. STAT. $ 6  311.730, .740 (1977); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12Q (West Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412 
(West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES 
ANN. § #  94-5-615 to -616 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§  14-02.1-02 to -03 (Supp. 1977); 35 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. $ 8  6602-6603 (Purdon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (1978). 
156. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS $ 18 (4th ed. 1971). 
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provisions. Some demand only a general expression of consent, 
while others specify in detail what information a woman must be 
given before she can effectively give her informed consent. 
General informed consent provisions are well illustrated by 
the Missouri provision sustained in Danforth. That provision re- 
quires that prior to submitting to an abortion a woman must 
certify in writing that she consents to it and that her consent is 
informed, freely given, and not the result of coercion.Iw Many 
states have enacted only the barest of consent requirements, 
doing little if anything beyond codifying common law rules.1w At 
this end of the continuum, regulation of the doctor-patient rela- 
tionship diminishes to the vanishing point and the statutes 
merely operate to protect a woman from undergoing an abortion 
against her will. 
More detailed informed consent provisions tend to resemble 
the statute adopted in Utah. Under its provisions, consent must 
be given in writing, and no consent is considered voluntary and 
informed unless the attending physician has informed the pro- 
spective abortion patient of a variety of matters that could bear 
upon her decision. Specifically, the woman must be given the 
names and addresses of two Utah adoption agencies, told of the 
availability of their services, and informed of the possibility of 
nonagency adoption. She must be apprised of the details of devel- 
opment of unborn children. The particulars of the abortion proce- 
dure and the nature of postoperative recovery must be described 
to her, along with any foreseeable complications and risks. Fur- 
ther, the doctor must discuss with her any additional factors that 
he or she deems relevant to the woman's informed consent.I5# 
Other detailed informed consent provisions vary slightly in 
the types of information required to be given. Most detailed pro- 
visions require that the woman be informed concerning fetal de- 
velopment, the nature of the procedure and possible complica- 
tions, and alternatives to abortion. The most detailed informed 
consent statute adopted to date is a recently enacted Louisiana 
- - - p p p  
157. Mo. ANN. STAT. 8 188.020 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Massachusetts also has a general 
statute of this type. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, 8 126 (West Supp. 1978-1979). 
158. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2555 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. 8 35-1-58.5-2 (Bums 1975); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. 8 442.250 (1977); N.Y. PENAL AW 
4 125.05 (McKinney 1975); OR. Rev. STAT. 8 435.435 (1977); S.C. CODE § 44-41-20 (1977); 
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 8 34-23A-7 (1977); W N .  CODE ANN. 39-301 (1975); VA. CODE 
4 18.2-76 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE 8 9.02.070 (1977). 
159. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 76-7-305 (1978). The Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Montana, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania statutes also give some description of what 
constitutes informed consent or mandate some counseling. See note 155 supra. 
7831 ABORTION COUNSELING 819 
provision.160 It requires the doctor to tell the woman that she is 
pregnant, indicate how many weeks her pregnancy has progres- 
sed, inform her that "the unborn child is a human life from the 
moment of conception," and describe "the anatomical and phy- 
siological characteristics of the particular unborn child." The 
doctor must also inform the woman that the "unborn child may 
be viable" if it is more than twenty-two weeks in gestation and 
that abortion can result in serious complications that are spelled 
out in the statute. Finally, the woman must be'told about public 
and private agencies from which she can receive family planning 
information and from which she may obtain assistance during 
pregnancy and after birth if she decides not to have an abortion.lsl 
The emergence of informed consent statutes in the abortion 
area is part of a broader development in tort law. Modem in- 
formed consent law as it has emerged over the past twenty yearsls2 
is a synthesis of battery notions of consent and negligence con- 
cepts of reasonable disclosure.lm The area is complex and, to be 
candid, somewhat of a m o r a s ~ . ~ ~ T o r  our purposes, however, a few 
general comments will suffice. Behind questions about how much 
information a doctor must give his patient to avoid malpractice 
liability lie much deeper concerns over state and doctor paternal- 
ism, as well as protection of the woman's autonomy.ls5 As one 
contrasts the general and specific informed consent statutes, for 
example, it seems evident that the reason for the more detailed 
disclosure requirements in the latter is to provide stronger assur- 
ances that the patient will receive the information needed for an 
autonomous decision. The general statutes leave more room for 
160. Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, § 1299.35.6, 1978 La. Sess. Law Serv. 
836 (West) (to be codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6 (West)). 
161. Id. 
162. Contemporary informed consent law is often traced to two sources: Salgo v. 
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1975), and 
McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. 
REV. 381, 392 (1957). See, e.g., Plante, An Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 639, 651 (1968); Abortion Alternative, supra note 79, a t  175 n.54. 
163. Katz, supra note 62, at 143; Abortion Alternative, supra note 79, a t  175. 
164. An extensive body of literature dealing with this issue has been produced. See, 
e.g., Hagman, The Medical Patient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical, 
Empirical Study, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 758 (1970); Katz, supra note 62; Plante, supra note 
162; Schneyer, supra note 70; Seidelson, supra note 62; Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed 
Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970); Note, Who's Afraid of Informed 
Consent? An Affirmative Approach to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 44 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 241, 259 (1978); Note, Advice and Consent in Medicine: A Look at the Doctrine of 
Informed Consent, 16 N.Y.L.F. 863 (1970); Note, Failure to Inform as Medical 
Malpractice, 23 VAND. L. REV. 754 (1970); Abortion Alternative, supra note 79. 
165. For an excellent discussion of informed consent law in terms of the tension 
between doctor paternalism and patient autonomy, see Katz, supra note 62. 
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doctor paternalism by giving the doctor more leeway to decide 
whether or not the patient needs particular information. At the 
same time, it seems clear that the more specific statutes involve 
a heavier dose of state paternalism. Detailed statutes reflect a 
legislative judgment that the doctor and patient are not capable 
of resolving on their own the extent to which disclosure occurs or 
decisionmaking is left with the doctor. One is reminded of Rous- 
seau's remark about being "forced to be free."166 The state adopts 
a paternalistic posture toward the doctor-patient relationship in 
order to protect the woman's autonomy from doctor paternalism. 
Whatever the paradoxes in this situation, there is no doubt 
that the theory behind the emerging pattern of informed consent 
statutes is to assure the patient greater autonomy in the making 
of treatment decisions. As a practical matter, doctor paternalism 
poses a greater threat to patient autonomy than state paternalism 
in this context, since the state merely mandates disclosure, 
whereas a variety of influences predispose doctors toward mini- 
mizing the time they spend educating patients.lm Thus, doctor 
paternalism is much more likely to remain invisible until it is too 
late for effective exercise of patient autonomy. Moreover, the 
realities of the abortion situation tend to promote reticence on the 
part of the woman and close off normal channels of communica- 
tion and support, so that the woman's decision is all too often 
made hurriedly without full consideration of its  ramification^.'^^ 
Part of what is going on in the informed consent area reflects 
a practical concern to circumvent the "conspiracy of doctor si- 
lence" in order to make it easier for malpractice cases to get to 
the jury."' Moreoyer, there is abundant evidence that informed 
consent provisions seldom lead to as much patient autonomy in 
practice as the underlying theory would suggest.170 All that is 
important for our purposes, however, is that informed consent 
statutes, even if only minimally effective in attaining their theo- 
retical ends, are at least conducive to expanding in some degree 
the autonomy of a woman faced with an abortion decision. If the 
166. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 18 (G. Cole trans. 1950). 
167. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 62, at 148 (speaking of strong doctor beliefs that 
patients are not intellectually or emotionally equipped to make difficult treatment deci- 
sions and of the "deeply ingrained Hippocratic tradition against disclosure"). See 
generally Schneyer, supra note 70. 
168. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 587 (E.D. Pa. 
1975) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 
U.S. 901 (1976). 
169. See, e.g., J. WALT & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 75 (1971); Schneyer, supra 
note 70, at 155 & n.135; Abortion Alternative, supra note 79, at 179. 
170. See Katz, supra note 62, at 164-74. 
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autonomy of the woman is the primary value behind her privacy 
right, it is difficult to see how informed consent statutes, which 
increase her autonomy, can be deemed to intrude on a woman's 
privacy right. 
B. Constitutionality of Informed Consent Provisions 
Although not explicit in the Court's analysis in Danforth, the 
foregoing reasoning is reflected in its result. The appellants in 
Danforth challenged Missouri's general informed consent provi- 
sion on the grounds that it  imposed an impermissible extra layer 
of regulation on the abortion decision in violation of earlier abor- 
tion decisions,171 and was vague and 0verbr0ad.l~~ The Supreme 
Court, in upholding the consent provision, reasoned that the deci- 
sion to have an abortion "is an important, and often a stressful 
one, and it is desirable and imperative that it  be made with full 
knowledge of its nature and  consequence^."^^^ Justice Stewart 
underscored the permissibility of informed consent statutes in his 
concurring opinion by stressing that the Court's holding in Roe 
v. Wade "was not intended to preclude the State from enacting 
a provision aimed at ensuring that the abortion decision is made 
in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion."17' The Court 
dispensed with the vagueness argument in a footnote, holding 
that the arguably vague term "informed" simply meant "the giv- 
ing of information to the patient as to just what would be done 
and as to its  consequence^."^^^ To give the term a more extensive 
meaning, the Court indicated, might "confine the attending phy- 
sician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the prac- 
tice of his profession."176 
Because Danforth involved a very general informed consent 
statute, the precise scope of its holding with regard to more de- 
tailed and arguably more intrusive consent requirements remains 
somewhat unclear. For the most part, the more detailed informed 
consent statutes reviewed since Danforth have withstood judicial 
scrutiny. In Hodgson v. L a w ~ o n l ~ ~  the Eighth Circuit sustained a 
Minnesota statute that made it "unlawful to perform an abortion 
without first obtaining the consent of the woman . . . after a full 
- - 
428 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,164-65 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 
179, 195-200 (1973)). 
Id. at 66. 
Id. at 67. 
Id. at 90 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
Id. at 67 n.8. 
Id. 
542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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explanation of the abortion procedure and its effect."'7n Similarly, 
in Wolfe u. Schroering,17' the Sixth Circuit upheld a Kentucky 
informed consent provision that requires physicians to "inform 
the expectant mother of the reasonably possible physical and 
mental consequences of the performance of the abortion or the 
nonperformance of the abortion."lRO Still more specific was the 
Pennsylvania statute sustained by a three-judge court in Planned 
Parenthood Association u. Fitzpatrick. lB1 That provision requires 
informed consent except where abortion is immediately necessary 
to save the life of the mother, and defines "informed consent" as 
a written statement, voluntarily entered into by the person upon 
whom an abortion is to be performed, whereby she specifically 
consents thereto. Such consent shall be deemed to be an in- 
formed consent only if it affirmatively appears in the written 
statement signed by the person upon whom the abortion is to 
be performed that she has been advised (i) that there may be 
detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not 
forseeable [sic], (ii) of possible alternatives to abortion, includ- 
ing childbirth and adoption, and (iii) of the medical procedures 
to be used. Such statement shall be signed by the physician or 
by a counselor authorized by him and shall also be made orally 
in readily understandable terms insofar as practi~able. '~~ 
Significantly, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed Fitz- 
patrick,lM citing Danforth. The Court's statements in other con- 
texts regarding the binding character of summary affirmances 
have been less than a model of consistency,lR4 but in light of 
dictum in Hicks v. MirandalR5 that such affirmances constitute 
adjudication on the merits, the Court's affirmance of Fitzpatrick 
would appear to control lower court adjudication in this area 
unless and until the Court revises its position-at least with re- 
gard to informed consent statutes no more detailed than Pennsyl- 
vania's. 
The only post-Danforth case to invalidate an informed con- 
sent statute is Wynn v. Scott. lR6 In that case, a three-judge court 
178. Id. at 1355-56 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. 8 145.412(1)(4)(West Supp. 1978)). 
179. 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976). 
180. Id. at 526 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. 5 311.730 (1977)). 
181. 401 F. Supp. 554, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 
428 U.S. 901 (1976). 
182. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6602 (Purdon 1977). 
183. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). 
184. See generally R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 321-25 (5th 
ed. 1978). 
185. 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975). See also Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U S .  173 (1977). 
186. 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978). An appeal from the decision in Wynn was 
7831 ABORTION COUNSELING 823 
sustained those portions of an Illinois statute modeled on the 
provision sustained in Danforth. However, the court struck down 
two further provisions that specified that no consent would be 
informed unless the woman was instructed regarding 
(a) The physical competency of the fetus at the time the abor- 
tion is to be performed, such as, but not limited to, what the 
fetus looks like, the fetus' ability to move, swallow, and its phys- 
ical characteristics; (b) The general dangers of abortion, includ- 
ing, but not limited to, the possibility of subsequent sterility, 
premature birth, liveborn fetus and other dangers . . . . 1x7 
Conscious of the Supreme Court's affirmance of Fitzpatrick, the 
court avoided premising its conclusion on an analysis of the im- 
pact of these provisions on the doctor-patient decisionmaking 
process. Instead, the court reasoned that the provisions were 
objectionable because they were "both overly vague and overly 
specific."la They were overly vague because the descriptions of 
specific facts the woman must be told were prefaced with the 
phrases "such as, but not limited to" and "including, but not 
limited to." Thus doctors were purportedly not given "fair warn- 
ing of what is required."18@ On the other hand, the provisions were 
supposedly too specific in that the physician was required to in- 
form the woman of dangers that might not be applicable in her 
situation (e.g., the possibility of live birth in the case of a woman 
seeking a first trimester abortion) .Ig0 
While these arguments have some force and indicate a need 
for careful drafting, differentiating the provisions in Wynn from 
those sustained in Fitzpatrick on the basis of vagueness or over- 
specificity is difficult. If anything, the Wynn statute is less vague 
because its drafters included specific instances of the types of 
information required, whereas the Fitzpatrick statute merely pro- 
vides a general description of such information.lgl The overspecif- 
filed with the Supreme Court but dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Carey v. Wynn, 99 S. 
Ct. 49 (1978). The dismissal did not go to the merits and merely indicated that the appeal 
from the declaratory judgment issued by the three-judge court in Wynn should have been 
to the court of appeals. Id. a t  50. 
187. Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, Q 3(2)(a), (b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-23(a), 
(b) (Smith-Hurd 1977). 
188. 449 F. Supp. at 1317. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. The authors of the Model Penal Code pursued a similar gambit in trying to 
circumvent void-for-vagueness problems in drafting their loitering statute. See MODEL 
PENAL CODE 8 250.6 (Proposed Final Draft, 1962). Cf. People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 
N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973) (holding statute with general description of loitering 
void for vagueness, but intimating that a statute following the approach of MODEL PENAL 
CODE 8 250.6 would be constitutional). 
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icity problem is also exaggerated. As the Fitzpatrick court noted, 
if some of the information the doctor is required to give the 
woman is inapplicable in the particular case, nothing prevents 
the doctor from telling her so after complying with the statute.lg2 
The *Wynn court's response appears to belg3 that it was precisely 
this type of contradictory verbal gymnastics that Justice Black- 
mun intended to rule out when he warned in Danforth against 
informed consent statutes that "confine the attending physician 
in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket."lg4 While this 
argument is not without plausibility, it would make better sense 
to construe the straitjacket metaphor more loosely to comport 
with Maher's emphasis on "unduly burdensome interference" 
with the abortion decisionmaking process.lg5 Informed consent 
provisions that call for an occasional qualifying remark or equiva- 
lent adaptation would not be objectionable under this analysis. 
Only provisions that are so detailed, unrealistic, or distorted that 
they impede rather than facilitate meaningful doctor-patient in- 
teraction would be prohibited. Inasmuch as the effect of informed 
consent is generally to expand the woman's autonomy, states 
should be granted wide latitude in framing such provisions. Con- 
sent requirements that are not drafted so as to dictate medical 
judgment or foreclose treatment options should be allowed. 
Justice Blackmun's straitjacket metaphor and the concomi- 
tant definition of "informed consent" as merely "the giving of 
information to the patient as to just what would be done and as 
to its  consequence^"^^^ could be taken to support only the consti- 
tutionality of "general" consent provisions. But such an interpre- 
tation would be exceedingly insensitive to the informational 
needs of a woman faced with an abortion decision. A narrow 
reading of Justice Blackmun's definition would limit the doctor's 
responsibility to informing the patient of the selected abortion 
method and of the fact that as a result of this procedure she would 
no longer be pregnant. Such a reading would ignore a woman's 
frequent need for much more detailed information about the na- 
ture of the procedure, its risks, and alternatives.lY7 Moreover, 
general provisions do very little to protect the woman from the 
possible bias of her physician. If the doctor is strongly pro- 
abortion, or has a financial interest in the potential abortion, he 
192. 401 F. Supp. at 587-88. 
193. See 449 F. Supp. at 1316-17. 
194. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976). 
195. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977). 
196. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976). 
197. See notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra. 
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or she may too easily conclude that the decision is not a critical 
one to the woman and that she needs very limited information 
before making the decision. log 
Finally, general statutes may ignore the woman's need for 
information about the facts of fetal development. If the doctor is 
not specifically required to provide this information, he may be 
able to meet his statutory obligation by describing the procedure 
as if nothing more were a t  stake than the removal of a benign 
growth. Yet information about fetal development may be more 
significant than anything else in shaping the woman's decision. 
It may have a crucial bearing on her postabortion mental 
health.'g0 And, leaving aside issues of maternal health, the state 
has a strong and legitimate interest in being certain that all par- 
ties to the abortion decision clearly understand that the destruc- 
tion of unborn human life will occur in the process.20o 
Detailed informed consent provisions come closer than gen- 
eral statutes to ensuking that each woman contemplating abor- 
tion has the information she needs to make an informed decision. 
In comparison to general statutes they do a better job of putting 
the doctor on notice of his responsibility to give the patient rele- 
vant information in each of the critical areas: nature and risks of 
the procedure, facts of reproduction and fetal development, and 
abortion  alternative^.^^' This is not to say that there are no prob- 
lems with the detailed provisions. Compliance with such statutes 
is more likely to degenerate into "disengaged monologues"2o2 or 
Miranda-style warnings than is compliance with a general stat- 
ute. Moreover, while doctors are generally well qualified to pro- 
vide medical information, they may not be fully aware of the 
nonmedical information relevant to abortion alternatives. States 
requiring doctors to provide such information203 might follow the 
lead of some European countries204 and equip doctors with infor- 
mation packets that they can give to their patients. Such packets 
should include addresses and phone numbers of public and pri- 
vate agencies that provide assistance to women with problem 
198. See notes 107-09 and accompanying text supra. 
199. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. 
200. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,478 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,446 (1977). 
See also notes 102-04 and accompanying text supra. 
201. See notes 58-75 and accompanying text supra. 
202. See Katz, supra note 62, at 147. 
203. See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, 4 1299.35.6(B)(7), 1978 La. 
Sess. Law Serv. 836 (West)(to be codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(7) 
(West)). 
204. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 17, 1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162-3(2) (Fr.), translated 
in 26 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, at 352 (1975). 
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pregnancies, as well as any additional information deemed useful. 
A doctor should not, however, be able to comply with an informed 
consent statute merely by handing a woman an information 
packet. That would reduce what is at worst a ritual warning to a 
silent (and totally inadequate) litany. 
C.  Waiting Period Requirements 
For informed consent provisions to be maximally effective, 
the required information ought to be provided well in advance of 
the abortion procedure. The twenty-four-hour period prior to the 
performance of an abortion is a period of great ambivalence and 
distress.205 Giving the woman information and counseling at  that 
point will probably not aid in her decisionmaking process and 
may even produce a great deal of anxiety.2w Several European 
countriesm and some statesa8 have responded to this problem by 
requiring that the woman receive counseling or informed consent 
information anywhere from a day to a week before the abortion. 
Since the twenty-four-hour period prior to the abortion is such a 
critical time, it would be best if the informing and counseling 
were completed at least twenty-four hours before the abortion 
decision is firmly made. In the designated waiting period, the 
woman will have sufficient time to weigh the information she has 
received, make her decision, and give her informed consent to any 
procedure she chooses. The delay can thus 'make a substantial 
contribution to expanding her rational autonomy.lD9 And, in most 
instances, a waiting period from one day to several days is not 
long enough to impact on the safety of the procedure or the type 
of procedure that could be used to perform an abortion.210 Of 
course, in emergency or life-threatening situations, the imposi- 
tion of a waiting period may be unreasonable or medically unsafe. 
205. Nadelson, supra note 54, a t  768. 
206. See id. 
207. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 17, 1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162-5 (Fr.) (one week), 
translated in 26 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, a t  351, 353 (1975); STRAPGESETZBUCH 
[STGB] (i 218b (1) (W. Ger.)(three days), translated in 27 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supm note 
110, at ,564 (1976). 
208. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. (i 436.023 (1977) (24 hours); Ad of July 10, 1978, Act 
No. 435, sec. 1, (i 1299.35.7, 1978 La. Sess. Law Serv. 836 (West) (to be codified as LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 40:1299.35.7 (West)). 
209. See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 123-24. 
210. Physicians are unable to determine the length of gestation in any one pregnancy 
with sufficient accuracy to enable a 24-hour period to serve as a transition between trimes- 
ters or to affect a judgment of fetal nonviability. Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526 
(6th Cir. 1976). 
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Currently, informed consent statutes in eight states provide for 
exceptions to normal consent requirements in life- threatening sit- 
u a t i o n ~ . ~ ~ '  Such exceptions should be built into all informed con- 
sent statutes and should apply to waiting period requirements. 
The constitutionality of a waiting period provision poses 
slightly different issues than that of informed consent provisions 
in general, but the result should be the same. In Wolfe v. 
S~hroering,"~ the only case to consider a waiting period require- 
ment to date, the Sixth Circuit sustained the validity of a twenty- 
four-hour provision.213 The court reasoned that a one-day delay 
would not result in a transition from one trimester to the next, 
and did ,not "significantly" burden the abortion process.214 Since 
the Supreme Court has concluded states may require informed 
consent even during the first trime~ter,~l%nd has allowed state 
action not constituting "unduly burdensome interference" with 
the abortion deci~ion,~l%hort waiting periods should be constitu- 
tional. After all, reasonable waiting periods are tolerated in a 
number of other areas, even when they limit the exercise of funda- 
mental rights. Most states require some waiting period between 
the application for a marriage license and the marriage.217 Simi- 
larly, voters may be required to register prior to the date of an 
After the first trimester, the woman's need for infor- 
mation to assist in the making of a rational abortion choice and 
the often stressful results of withholding such information until 
the time of the procedure are sufficiently related to the state's 
then-compelling interest in maternal health to justify a reason- 
able waiting period requirement. 
D. Enforcing Informed Consent Provisions 
A final point needs to be made about enforcing compliance 
with informed consent statutes. While most members of the med- 
ical profession would no doubt comply with such statutes in good 
faith, there is always the possibility that any given physician 
211. IDAHO CODE Sj 18-609 (Supp. 1978); KY. REV. STAT. Sj 436.010 (1977); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, Sj 126 (West Supp. 1978-1979); MWN. STAT. ANN. Sj 145.412 (West 
Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. Sj 94-5-616 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE Sj 14-02.1-03 
(Supp. 1977); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Sj 6603 (Purdon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. 4 76-7-315 
541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976). 
Id. at 526. 
Id. 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976). 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 38 (1968). 
See Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). 
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might treat such obligations cavalierly. Thus, most informed con- 
sent statutes make failure to comply a rni~demeanor."~ Although 
criminal sanctions may be important as a last resort, prosecutors 
are likely to proceed against doctors only rarely, with the result 
that such sanctions would be underenforced. Moreover, it is pri- 
marily the criminal dimension of informed consent statutes that 
gives rise to the void-for-vagueness problem discussed in connec- 
tion with the Wynn case above;220 the vagueness doctrine is nor- 
mally inapplicable in civil  context^."^ For these reasons, states 
may wish to pay greater attention to civil remedies that would 
provide compliance incentives. 
In most states, the impact on civil litigation of noncompli- 
ance with informed consent provisions is solely a matter of case 
law. Illinois appears to be the only state that has established by 
statute the civil consequences of noncompliance. Illinois' in- 
formed consent statute provides that "[alny intentional viola- 
tion of this section shall be admissible in a civil suit as prima facie 
evidence of the physician's failure to obtain an informed con- 
sent."222 In the absence of similarly specific legislation, courts 
may hold that noncompliance with an informed consent statute 
invokes the doctrine of "negligence per se."223 The resulting real- 
location of the burden of proof may encourage doctors to comply 
with the statute. However, application of the negligence per se 
doctrine will have widely differing results in different jurisdic- 
219. Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, 8 3(2), Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 8 81-23 (Smith-Hurd 
1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. 4 188.075 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 8 94-5- 
616(5) (1977); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 4 6603(e) (Purdon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. 4 76-7- 
314(3) (1978). Minnesota makes failure to comply a felony. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412 
subd. 4 (West Supp. 1978). Kentucky and Massachusetts impose fines of up to $1,000 and 
$2,000 respectively. Kentucky also imposes a penalty of one year in prison. KY. REV. STAT. 
Q 311.990(13) (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, 4 12T (West Supp. 1978-1979). 
Missouri provides for revocation of the physician's professional license as well as a misde- 
meanor conviction. Mo. ANN. STAT. 8 188.065 (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
220. See notes 186-95 and accompanying text supra. 
221. See generally Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A Focus on the 
Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855, 855 n.1 (1974); Note, The 
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 69 n.16 (1960). 
In recent years, there has been some extension of the vagueness doctrine to civil statutes, 
but this has been true primarily in areas where civil remedies are closely analogous in their 
impact to criminal sanctions. See Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A 
ficus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855, 862 & n.32 
(1974). Where the civil statute merely involves shifting the burden of proof in ordinary 
civil litigation, as suggested in the text, vagueness concerns would be unlikely to arise. 
222. Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, 8 3(2), Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 8 81-23 (Smith-Hurd 
1977). The Missouri statute provides that nothing contained therein will exempt any 
person from civil liability for negligent acts. Mo. ANN. STAT. 8 188.085 (Vernon Supp. 
1978). 
223. W. PROSSER, supra note 156, 8 36, a t  200-02. 
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ti on^;^^^ in at least some, the practical impact on potential physi- 
cian liability will be de minimus. 
Because of the amorphous and unsettled state of case law 
governing the civil significance of informed consent requirements 
and the doctrine of negligence per se, greater clarity could be 
achieved for all affected parties if legislatures would follow Illi- 
nois' lead and incorporate clear statements of the civil conse- 
quences of noncompliance into informed consent statutes. Such 
statements could track the language of the Illinois statute and 
make noncompliance with an informed consent statute prima 
facie evidence of failure to obtain informed consent. Legislatures 
could establish rebuttable or irrebuttable presumptions of mal- 
practice. They could also establish presumptions that would op- 
erate to benefit physicians. 
Doctors might welcome informed consent provisions requir- 
ing that detailed written consent be given. Such provisions would 
help insulate them against charges of inadequate disclosure by 
providing written evidentiary documents that would avoid the 
necessity of relying on vague or contradictory recollections of a 
particular discussion crucial to a malpractice case.225 Doctors may 
also appreciate legislative guidelines concerning the proper medi- 
cal standard for informed consent because abortion has greater 
emotional and moral overtones than most medical procedures 
involved in malpractice cases. The standards normally applicable 
in other malpractice cases may be meaningless if abortion mal- 
practice trials degenerate into microcosmic showdowns between 
pro-abortion and anti-abortion forces, as has happened in a num- 
ber of recent abortion-related cases.226 
224. The possible effects on civil litigation of violating a state statute have been 
described as follows: 
(1) Such conduct is conclusively negligence as a matter of law; 
(2) Such conduct is presumed to be negligence as a matter of law until evi- 
dence is received tending to show that the violation was excusable under 
the circumstances; 
(3) Such conduct is prima facie evidence of negligence, so that from the viola- 
tion alone the jury may infer that the person was negligent; 
(4) Such conduct is evidence of negligence which the jury may consider, but 
is not, standing alone, sufficient to support a finding of negligence; or 
(5) The conduct may, in itself, constitute negligence or may be evidence of it, 
but the fact is wholly irrelevant that a statute . . . was violated in the 
process. 
Comment, Contributory Negligence in Five Midwestern States-Some Rarrier.~ for Plain- 
tiff to Hurdle in Auto Accident Cases, 1954 Wm. L. REV. 95, 116. The author implies that 
the first and fifth options are rarely the rule and warns that the standard may differ 
depending on which statute has been violated. Id. at  116-17. 
225. Note, Who's Afraid of Informed Consent? An Affirmative Approach to the Medi- 
cal Malpractice Crisis, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 241, 259-62 (1978). 
226. See, e .g ,  Commonwealth v. Edelin, - Mass. , 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976); The 
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Overall, then, there is much to be said for detailed informed 
consent statutes that include provisions governing civil liability 
for noncompliance. Such provisions help ensure a meaningful 
doctor-patient interaction that will permit maximum autonomy 
to the woman faced with an abortion decision. 
IV. COUNSELING 
A. The Appropriateness of Counseling Requirements 
While informed consent statutes can make a substantial con- 
tribution to meaningful doctor-patient interaction, there is some- 
thing awkward, something unmistakably wooden about the in- 
formed consent approach. It is as if the law were being used to 
bludgeon a human relationship into existence. The needed inter- 
personal dynamics are too rich to be captured in the dead lan- 
guage of a statute and too dependent on natural fellow feeling to 
be coerced. These considerations suggest that skillful counseling 
is the ideal approach to assuring that the woman receives the 
information and help she needs in determining whether or not to 
obtain an abortion. Indeed, as one contemplates the Supreme 
Court's emphasis on the "consulting physician,"227 it seems clear 
that counseling is precisely what the Supreme Court had in mind. 
In the Court's mythology of the doctor-patient relationship, the 
woman reaches the decision whether or not to terminate her preg- 
nancy only after careful and sensitive consultation with a medical 
expert who is aware not only of her physical situation, but of her 
emotional, psychological, and familial needs as well.22u 
Counseling transcends other approaches to assisting the 
woman precisely because its aim is not merely to provide her with 
information, but also to help her make an extremely personal 
decision in a sensitive and personal manner. But the same highly 
personal dimension of counseling that gives it its flexibility and 
appeal may constitute the primary obstacle to implementing 
abortion-counseling schemes in the United States. Counseling is 
so inherently personal that by its very nature it eludes easy and 
mechanical management. The resulting uncertainties about the 
precise impact of counseling on the abortion decisionmaking pro- 
cess exacerbate the constitutional questions surrounding the per- 
Trial of Dr. Waddill, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1978, at 35; The Ordeal of a Divided Jury, TIME, 
May 22, 1978, at 24. 
227. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 47 U.S.L.W. 4094, 4096-97 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163-64 (1973). See also notes 1-10 and accompanying text 
supra. 
228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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missibility of mandatory counseling schemes. Moreover, from a 
purely political perspective, however much competing pressure 
groups may favor counseling in principle, they may be reluctant 
to press for it in practice because there is no way for them to feel 
confident about the content of the counseling that would be ren- 
dered. As long as there are fears that it would be constitutionally 
impermissible or effectively impossible to control the orientation 
of counseling, pro-life groups will worry that counseling might 
tend to assuage guilt rather than deter abortions, and pro-choice 
groups will fear that counseling might degenerate into harass- 
ment of the woman seeking an abortion.22Y Legally mandated 
counseling has thus failed to emerge in the United States. 
Yet the need for counseling is acute. There is a wealth of 
information attesting to the need for counseling in the abortion 
context.2m As a consequence, many European countries that have 
recently liberalized their abortion laws have paid careful atten- 
tion to integrating cdunseling into the abortion process.231 In the 
United States, the need to assure that at least some counseling 
occurs within the confines of the doctor-patient relationship has 
been heightened in the aftermath of Danforth. Since Danforth 
may tend to isolate the woman making the abortion decision from 
typical sources of social and emotional support by denying her 
parents, spouse, or the father of the child a final say in the abor- 
tion choice, the woman may be in particularly great need of sensi- 
tive personal help from her doctor. Experience in Germany has 
suggested that counseling may be particularly significant for mi- 
nors faced with the difficult abortion choice.232 In post-Danforth 
America, therefore, counseling with the woman's consulting phy- 
sician takes on added significance if the isolated woman's overall 
needs in the abortion context are to be met.233 To the extent that 
political realities and apprehensions about constitutionality oper- 
ate to preclude the emergence of counseling schemes, women in 
need of counseling are the ultimate losers. 
The solution to this situation appears to lie in rethinking the 
- - -  
229. See O'Reilly, supra note 73, at 74. 
230. See, e.g., Bracken, supra note 54, at 265-66; Butler & Fujita, supra note 48, at 
210-12; Kay & Thompson, An Outcome Evaluation of Counseling Services Provided by 
Abortion Clinics, 15 MED. CARE 858, 858-59 (1977); Marglolis, Some Thoughts on Medical 
Evaluation and Counseling of Applicants for Abortion, 14 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 1255, 1257 (1971); Nadelson, supra note 54, at 767-69; West & Walsh, supra 
note 54. 
231. See notes 234-71 and accompanying text infra. 
232. See Beulke, Zur Reform des Schwangerschaftsabbruches durch das 15. Straf- 
recht~&zderurzgsgesetz, 1976 ZE~CHRIFT ~ ! R  DAS GEsAMTE FAMILIENRECHT 596, 597. 
233. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra. 
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implications of Roe u. Wade and its progeny. Once one begins 
analyzing the Supreme Court's abortion decisions as rooted in a 
concern for rational female autonomy, arguing for the permissi- 
bility of a t  least certain types of counseling schemes becomes 
easier. Before turning to the constitutional issues, however, it will 
be useful to consider three differing approaches to counseling that 
have been developed in Europe. This will provide a basis for a 
better understanding of the varying ways in which counseling can 
be integrated into an abortion scheme, and will make possible a 
more concrete analysis of the constitutional issues. 
B. European Counseling Schemes 
I .  Germany 
In part because of the unique history of abortion reform ef- 
forts in Germany, counseling has assumed a particularly impor- 
tant role in the legislative scheme governing abortion there. The 
current abortion statuteu4 was passed in response to the West 
German Constitutional Court's 1975 determination that a prior 
abortion liberalization scheme235 was uncon~titutional.~~~ The 
law2" provides that abortion constitutes a criminal offense except 
when performed by a physician, with the pregnant woman's con- 
sent, and within appropriate time limits238 when a generalized 
"indication" of a need for the abortion is present. The generalized 
234. STGB !j!j218-219 (W. Ger.), as amended by Das 15. Strafrechtsanderungsgesetz 
vom 18.5.1976, translated in 27 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, a t  562-65 (1976). 
235. The text of the initial West German abortion legislation of 1974 is available in 
25 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, at 779-83 (1974). 
236. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 39 Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfGEl 1 (1975). This judgment was also published in 2 EUROP~ISCHE GRUNDRECHTE 
ZEITSCHRIFT 126; 1975 JURISTENZEITUNG 205; 127 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIF~ 574 
(1975). English translations of the judgment were published in Jonas & Gorby, West 
German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 605 
(1976); E. JANN, THE ABORT~ON DECISION OF FEBRUARY 25, 1975 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU- 
TIONAL COURT, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1975). 
237. Specifically, STGB 4 218a(l) (W. Ger.) provides that: 
(1) The termination of pregnancy performed by a physician shall not be 
punishable . . . provided that: 
. . . a  
2. according to medical findings, a pregnancy termination is indi- 
cated, taking account of the present and future living conditions of the 
pregnant woman, in order to avert a risk to the life or a risk of serious 
damage to the physical or mental state of health of the pregnant 
woman, and such risk cannot be averted by any other means that the 
woman can be expected to accept. 
Id., translated in 27 WHO INT'L DIGEST, swra  note 110. at 563 (1976). 
238. A pregnancy may only be terminated on the basis of the eugenic indication 
within the first 22 weeks following conception, or on the basis of the juridical or social 
indications within the first 12 weeks. Id. 4 218a(3). 
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indication is present whenever, in light of the totality of the 
woman's circumstances, the woman cannot reasonably be ex- 
pected to continue with the pregnancy because of grave risk to her 
physical or mental health.239 The statute further establishes a 
presumption that the generalized indication is present if there is 
a compelling reason to assume that the child would be born with 
a severe birth defect (eugenic indication), if the pregnancy is the 
result of an unlawful act such as rape or incest (juridical indica- 
tion), or if the general circumstances of the woman's life place her 
in such state of material necessity (Notlage) that she cannot 
fairly be expected to continue with the pregnancy (social indica- 
tion) 
In addition to requiring that the presence of one of these 
indications be confirmed by a doctor other than the doctor that 
will perform the abortion,241 the statute provides that anyone who 
performs an abortion on a woman who has not received counsel- 
ing a t  least three days before the abortion from an individual or 
agency legally authorized to provide such counseling is subject to 
criminal sanctions.242 The woman herself is not subject to punish- 
ment under this provision on the theory that she is more likely 
to seek counseling'if she knows there is absolutely no legal risk 
associated with her doing so. A broad network of counseling cen- 
ters has been established; as of the end of 1976, there were more 
than 600 centers where free abortion counseling could be ob- 
tained.243 In addition, the statute provides that the counseling 
may be given by a doctor (other than the one performing the 
abortion) if he has appropriate qualifications to give the requisite 
c~unseling.~ '~ The wording of the statute makes it clear that the 
239. Id. 5 218a(1)2. 
240. Id. 5 218a(2). 
241. Id. 4 219. 
242. Id. 5 218b (providing for imprisonment of up to one year and a criminal fine). 
243. Franz, Kosten der sozialen Beratung nach der Reform des ,f 218 StGR, 29 NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRI~ 1085, 1086 (1977) (citing INFORMATIONEN DES B U N D E S I ~ I S -  
TERIUMS JUCEND, FAMILIE UND GESUNDHEIT, ZUR PRAKTIZIERUNG DER EUREGELUNG UBER 
DEN SCHWANGERSCHAFTSABBRUCH 3 (1976)). 
244. See notes 250-54 and accompanying text infra. One of the difficult problems 
currently being faced in the course of implementing the new German abortion statute 
concerns the question of who pays for counseling services provided by the doctor instead 
of by one of the many free counseling centers. State insurance coverage may be construed 
as denying coverage for counseling provided by a doctor concerning the woman's social 
situation, and a growing number of doctors and health institutions are proceeding on the 
basis of this construction. See Franz, supra note 243, a t  1087. However this problem is 
ultimately resolved in Germany, its existence points to an important practical issue that 
must ultimately be faced in the United States if more intensive counseling requirements 
are adopted here. Will insurance coverage and state or federal funding be available to 
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counseling must occur in person; counseling over the telephone 
for example would not suffice.245 
Two phases or components of counseling are envisioned. The 
first, which must be obtained at  least three days before the abor- 
tion is performed, is generally referred to as social counseling. The 
statute requires that the pregnant woman be apprised of the vari- 
ety .of public and private sources of aid available to assist her with 
both the continuation of her pregnancy and the alleviation of 
difficult circumstances that might accrue as a result of an addi- 
tional child. While the statute itself does not specify any particu- 
lar orientation for this counseling, it is quite clear from the back- 
ground of the legislation that it is to be given a pro-life direc- 
tion .24fi 
- - - - - - 
cover the cost of the increased expenditure of a doctor's time necessitated by more exten- 
sive counseling? 
245. See Beulke, supra note 232, at 600; Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki, Zur Reform der 
S trafvorschriften iiber den Schwangerschaftsa b bruch, 1976 JURISTENZEITUNG 329, 333. 
246. The prior abortion legislation struck down by the constitutional court provided 
that there would he no criminal sanctions for a woman who obtained an abortion after 
receiving counseling during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. See 25 WHO INT'L DIGEST, 
supra note 110, at 779-83 (1974). Advocates of the time-phase approach to regulating 
abortion during the early phase of pregnancy, which was incorporated in the prior law, 
had argued that developing life is better protected by individual counseling of the preg- 
nant woman than by penal sanctions. Penal sanctions might deter a woman from seeking 
counseling for fear that she would reveal her pregnancy at  the counseling stage and then 
be unable to obtain an abortion in the event the counseling did not indicate an abortion. 
See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 52 (1975); Jonas & 
Gorby, supra note 236, at 650. The court rejected this aproach for two reasons. The major 
reason was that the time-phase approach, despite its counseling feature, legalized even 
nonindicated abortion during the first trimester. The court held that this was inconsistent 
with the state's obligation to .protect incipient life under the German Constitution. 39 
BVerfGE at  53-54; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, at 651-52. The second objection to the 
counseling scheme in the earlier legislation was that it appeared to require only that the 
woman be "instructed" (unterrichtet) concerning "the public and private assistance 
available for pregnant women, mothers, and the children, particularly concerning such 
assistance which alleviates the continuation of the pregnancy and the situation of the 
mother and child." 39 BVerfGE at  61; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, at 657-58. In the 
court's view, mere instruction was not enough. The court's criticism of the prior counsel- 
ing scheme implied that, to be consonant with German constitutional requirements, the 
counseling must be directed toward persuading a woman to continue her pregnancy. See 
39 BVerfGE at  61-62; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t  657-58. Moreover, the court 
indicated that a counseling scheme equipped with the capacity to provide direct financial 
assistance in appropriate cases in addition to mere advice would be less objectionable in 
that such a scheme would be much more likely to play a determinative role in deterring 
abortions. See 39 BVerfGE at 61; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t  657. Under the new 
statute, the term "unterrichtet" has been replaced with a much stronger term (beraten) 
which has a meaning somewhere between "counseled" and "admonished." Commentators 
have been alert to the difference, and it is well understood that the type of counseling now 
required must aim at  protecting developing life. See, e.g., Beulke, supra note 232, at 600; 
Lackner, Die Neuregelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs, 28 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIF~ 1233, 1239-40 (1976); Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki, supra note 245, a t  333. 
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The second aspect of the current German counseling scheme 
requires that the woman be counseled concerning the medically 
significant aspects of the procedure.247 This counseling may or 
may not be provided by the same individual who provides the 
social counseling. Although the statute is unclear as to whether 
or not the social counseling must precede the medical counseling, 
this order would appear to make sense if the two are to be con- 
ducted separately.24n Significantly, counseling is not required 
even under the new statute in situations where the reason for the 
abortion is a threat to the life or physical health of the mother.24Y 
Assessing the qualifications of those rendering the counseling 
service 1s one of the difficult problems under the German scheme. 
The problem relates not to the qualifications of those working for 
government counseling centers, churches, or other such organiza- 
tions that have historically played a significant role in abortion 
counseling,25o but with the qualifications physicians must have in 
order to provide the required counseling. In its 1975 abortion 
decision, the constitutional court sharply questioned whether 
physicians could give competent social coun~eling.~~'  Physicians, 
the court reasoned, are experts in medical matters, but cannot be 
expected to have expertise in the intricacies of German social 
welfare law (e.g., they may not be familiar with sources of rental 
assistance, income assistance, and other sources of state aid that 
may alleviate the problems leading a woman to seek an abor- 
t i ~ n ) . ~ " ~  A number of scholars have accordingly voiced doubts 
about whether the qualifications a doctor must have in order to 
provide c o ~ n s e l i n g ~ ~  are sufficient to meet the constitutional 
247. STGB Q 218b(1)2 (W. Ger.), translated in 27 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, 
at  564 (1976). 
248. See Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki, supra note 245, a t  333. 
249. STGB Q 218b(3) (W. Ger.), translated in 27 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, 
at  564 (1976). 
250. Section 218b(2) specifies that "a counseling center recognized by an authority 
[Behiirde] or corporation, institution, or foundation of public law" (authors' translation) 
may perform the statutory counseling. Id. 4 218b(2)1. Since all major and most minor 
religious denominations are public law entities (Korperschaften des Offentlichen Rechts), 
see generally Solte, Die Organisationsstruktur der Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschafter, 
in 1 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 341 (E. Frie- 
senhahn, U. Scheuner, & J. List1 eds. 1974), the foregoing provision makes it clear that 
these denominations may recognize and thereby authorize counseling centers. See 
Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki,. supra note 245, a t  334 (noting that the legislative purpose for 
giving these various entities such authorizing power was to establish a broad network of 
counseling centers). 
251. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 62-63 (1975); 
Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t  658-59. 
252. 39 BVerfGE a t  62-63, Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t  658-59. 
253. Counseling may be provided by a physician if: (1) he is a member of a recognized 
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court's objections to doctor-provided counseling under the pre- 
vious statutory scheme.2M Similar concerns could obviously arise 
with regard to physician counseling in the United States. 
One of the interesting points of the German counseling 
scheme is that its initial proponents under the prior law were 
convinced that counseling would be more efficacious in the con- 
text of a time-phase resolution to the abortion controversy, such 
as that adopted in the United States, than in the statutory indi- 
cation solution ultimately adopted? As noted above, they were 
convinced that more women would actually seek counseling if 
they viewed it as a ticket to a legal abortion rather than part of a 
larger state strategy explicitly aimed at  deterring abortions. This 
is significant, because i t  suggests that the introduction of counsel- 
ing requirements in the United States may be even more benefi- 
cial than counseling as i t  exists in Germany since the Supreme 
Court's rulings here have precluded the possibility of counseling 
schemes designed to impose substantive constraints on the 
woman's ultimate abortion choice during the first trimester of 
pregnancy. 
2. France 
Like Germany, France has recently liberalized its abortion 
laws and has also integrated a counseling scheme into this new 
legal framework. Under French law, a woman in "a situation of 
di~tress"~" may make a request'for the termination of her preg- 
counseling center; (2) he has been recognized as a counselor by a public law entity, see 
note 250, supra; or (3) he has obtained information regarding assistance available in 
individual cases by consulting with a staff member of an approved counseling center. 
STGB (5 2186(2)2 (W. Ger.), translated in 27 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, a t  564 
(1976). Understandably, the third method of qualification has attracted the most criticism 
because it is difficult to see how any physician can fail to meet its requirements. 
254. See, e.g., Beulke, supra note 232, a t  601. Cf. Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki, supra note 
245, a t  334-35 (arguing that the new rules do meet the constitutional court's objections 
concerning a physician's lack of qualification in the social counseling area if they are 
narrowly construed). 
255. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 52 (1975); 
Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t  650. Cf. Lackner, supra note 246, a t  1240 (noting that 
a counseling scheme has a different significance in a statutory scheme that takes a time- 
phase approach to the problem than it  has where the indication approach has been 
adopted). 
256. Neither the text of the statute, Act of Jan. 17, 1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162- 
1 to -14 (Fr.), translated in 26 WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, a t  351-54 (1975), nor 
the decision of the French Constitutional Court sustaining the statute, Judgment of Jan. 
15, 1975, Con. const., Fr., [I9751 Juris-Classeur periodique, la semaine juridique 
(J.C.P.1 I1 18030, translated in A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: 
AN INTRODUCTION T  THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 337 (2d ed. 1977), articulates what 
constitutes a "situa~ion of distress." Presumably, it would be a situation similar to one 
constituting a "social indication" in Germany. 
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nancy, and, provided she complies with the counseling require- 
ments imposed by law, may obtain an abortion prior to the tenth 
week of pregnan~y.~" 
The French counseling scheme involves two stages. The first 
is similar in many respects to detailed informed consent statutes 
in the United States. That  is, a physician who has been ap- 
proached by a woman seeking an abortion must inform her of the 
medical risks involved and must provide her with an information 
folder containing "(a) a list of the rights, forms of assistance, and 
benefits guaranteed by the law to families, mothers, including 
unmarried mothers, and their children, as well as the possibilities 
offered by child adoption; (b) a list of the names and addresses 
of [counseling institutions]. "258 
Once a woman has received this information she must re- 
ceive counseling from an approved counseling institution.259 The 
counseling involved must consist of a private interview during 
which the woman is to be provided with the assistance and advice 
appropriate to her situation and, importantly, with the necessary 
means to resolve the problems posed.26o While i t  is not clear from 
the statute exactly how much the approved institutions are able 
to do in terms of pioviding direct financial assistance, i t  is clear 
that affirmative help is to be provided through the counseling 
system to help alleviate social or economic problems that may be 
leading the woman to seek a termination of her pregnancy. 
Once the woman has received the requisite counseling, she 
is free to repeat her request for an ab~r t ion.~"  There must be a t  
least one week between the time that the woman first requests an 
abortion and the time that a doctor receives confirmation from 
the woman that she still desires the abortion.2e2 Assuming that 
the ten-week period from conception has not lapsed, the doctor 
is then free to perform the abortion himself or to provide the 
257. Act of Jan. 17, 1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162-1 to -14 (Fr.), translated in 26 
WHO INT'L DIGEST, supra note 110, a t  351-54 (1975). A woman may also obtain an abortion 
"at any stage of gestation if two physicians certify . . . that the continuation of the 
pregnancy is seriously endangering the woman's health or that there is a strong possibility 
that the unborn child is suffering from a particularly serious disease or condition consid- 
ered as incurable at the time of diagnosis." Id. art. L. 162-12. As in Germany, the counsel- 
ing requirements are not triggered for therapeutic abortions. The French scheme differs 
in not requiring counseling for abortions indicated on eugenic grounds. 
258. Id. art. L. 162-3(2)(a)-(b). 
259. Article L. 163-4 provides that she must "consult a family information, counsell- 
ing, or advisory establishment, a family planning or education centre, a social welfare 
service, or any other approved institution . . . ." Id. art. L. 162-4. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. art. L. 162-5. 
262. Id. 
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woman with a document certifying that he has completed his 
portion of the counseling requirements so that the woman may 
apply to another physician for the abortion without having to 
repeat these steps.263 
The counseling scheme in France thus appears to be similar 
in many respects to that in Germany. It is obviously designed to 
help provide the woman with information and resources that may 
alleviate the problems leading her to seek an abortion: The 
French scheme is more explicit than the German plan, however, 
in its recognition that the woman may choose to reject the advice 
received from the approved counseling centers and request an 
abortion. Once that decision has been reached, the position of the 
French statutory scheme seems to be that the state has done all 
it can to inform the woman of the value of the potential life at  
stake. The ultimate decision is then left to the individual woman. 
Under the German scheme, a woman who desires an abortion 
after counseling may not lawfully obtain one unless an abortion 
is indicated in her case. 
3. Iceland 
A rather different approach to counseling has been adopted 
in I~eland.~"  Under Icelandic law, a woman may obtain an abor- 
tion if the termination of pregnancy is called for as a result of 
medical, eugenic, juridical, or social indications. The circum- 
stances giving rise to the social indication are rather loosely 
drawn. The statute speaks in terms of "unsurmountable social 
 circumstance^,"^^^ but examples of circumstances that will give 
rise to this situation include "the presence of young children" in 
the home and situations where a woman, apparently without 
regard to her economic circumstances, has given birth to several 
children at frequent intervals and only a short time has elapsed 
since the previous birth.266 
Under the Icelandic statute everyone has a right to counsel- 
ing,2R7 but counseling is not mandatory except to the extent that 
a woman seeking an abortion "must have been informed of the 
risks associated with the procedure and have received informa- 
tion as to the social assistance which she is entitled to receive 
- - -  
263. Id. art. L. 162-6. 
264. Act of May 22, 1975 (Iceland), translated i n  28 WHO ~ T ' L  DIGEST, supra note 
110, at 614-16 (1977). 
265. Id. 5 9(1). 
266. Id. 5 9(l)(a)-(b). 
267. Id. 5 1. 
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from the community."26n In any event, "[all1 counseling and 
information shall be given impartially."26g Thus, while individu- 
als may receive basically the same counseling that would be 
available in France or Germany (i. e. medical assistance, preg- 
nancy testing, interviews intended to provide advice and support, 
and social assistance),270 the counseling is just as likely to be 
oriented toward providing support for a decision to terminate a 
pregnancy, as encouraging a woman to carry her pregnancy full 
term? Counseling in Iceland is thus clearly nondirective in na- 
ture and is by no means mandatory. 
C. Permissible Counseling Schemes in the United States 
The German, French, and Icelandic counseling schemes are 
indicative of a spectrum of possible approaches that might be 
considered in the United States, ranging from mandatory, ori- 
ented counseling at the one extreme to optional, nondirective 
counseling at  the other. Before proceeding with the effort to ana- 
lyze precisely where along this continuum the constitutional line 
between permissible and impermissible schemes lies, two prelim- 
inary points should be made. 
First, there can be no doubt that a state may take steps to 
make counseling services along the lines of the Icelandic model 
available to women desiring them. As long as the woman is not 
required to submit to counseling in order to obtain an abortion, 
counseling services are merely one of a wide range of social ser- 
vices that the state may permissibly provide. Indeed, as long as 
the counseling is optional, there would appear to be no objection 
to counseling oriented toward encouraging normal childbirth. Of 
course, if it were widely known that the aim of state counselors 
was to dissuade women from obtaining an abortion, relatively few 
women seeking an abortion would choose to undergo such coun- 
seling. In an optional system, nondirective counseling would ac- 
cordingly be much more likely not only to meet genuine counsel- 
ing needs but also to reduce the number of abortions obtained. 
Greater attention should be paid to the potential value of volun- 
tary counseling schemes both by those concerned with meeting 
the needs of women considering abortion and by those anxious to 
encourage greater sensitivity to the value of fetal life. 
Second, while the German mandatory, oriented counseling 
268. Id. Ei 12. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 0 6. 
271. Id. 09 2, 6(5). 
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has a definite pro-life cast, it must be remembered that counsel- 
ing with an opposite orientation is equally conceivable. In coun- 
tries with severe population problems, for instance, it is easy to 
imagine the introduction of a counseling system with a definite 
pro-abortion slant. Both possibilities must be considered when 
one evaluates the constitutionality of mandatory, directive coun- 
seling. 
The difficult constitutional issues with respect to counseling 
center on three questions. First, is a mandatory counseling 
scheme of any type permissible under Roe u. Wade and its pro- 
geny, particularly during the first trimester? Second, assuming 
that some mandatory counseling is permissible, to what extent 
can a state legislature insist that the counseling have a particular 
orientation? That is, may a system as rigorously pro-life as the 
German scheme be adopted or is the apparently nondirective 
form of counseling called for under the French scheme the most 
that can be required? Third, can counseling with anyone other 
than the woman's consulting physician be mandated? To sim- 
plify the analysis, it will be useful to proceed by analyzing the 
first two questions on the assumption that it is counseling by the 
attending physician that is in issue. Broader questions about the 
permissibility of mandatory third-party counseling can more eas- 
ily be dealt with in conjunction with the third question. 
With regard to the first question, the Supreme Court's allow- 
ance of mandatory informed consent provisions and mandatory 
recordkeeping and reporting procedures even during the first 
trimester,272 taken together with the Supreme Court's heavy ins- 
istence on the significance of doctor-patient consultation in the 
abortion de~ision,~~9uggests  that an appropriately limited coun- 
seling requirement may be permissible. As this Article has 
S ~ O W I I , ~ ~ ~  the crucial issue under current case law is whether a 
particular counseling scheme operates as an "unduly burdensome 
i n t e r f e r e n ~ e ~ ~ ~ w i t h  the woman's abortion choice. As long as a 
scheme is carefully designed to avoid such interference, the strict 
"compelling state interest" test would not come into play, and 
the scheme's constitutionality would be evaluated in terms of the 
more flexible "rational basis" te~t.~~"ince a counseling scheme 
would further legitimate state interests in promoting female au- 
tonomy, protecting maternal health, and encouraging normal 
- - -- - - 
272. See notes 130-38, 154-58 and accompanying text supra. 
273. See notes 1-12 and accompanying text supra. 
274. See notes 100-04 and accompanying text supra. 
275. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
276. See notes-94-104 and accompanying text supra. 
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childbirth,277 meeting this more relaxed standard would not be a 
problem. 
With these principles in mind, there would appear to be no 
constitutional obstacle to a statute requiring a doctor to provide 
nondirective counseling to a patient seeking an abortion. In a 
sense, the informed consent statutes discussed in Section I11 are 
designed to promote indirectly that very result. They may be 
viewed (and utilized) as a means of assuring that some minimal 
quantum of counseling, whatever its content, has occurred. 
Surely that which can be done indirectly via informed consent 
statutes can be done directly with a counseling statute. A statute 
requiring a woman to spend fifteen to thirty minutes counseling 
with her physician before finalizing an abortion decision can 
scarcely be characterized as an "unduly burdensome interfer- 
ence" with the abortion decision. Such a statute merely assures 
materialization of the doctor-patient consultation that has been 
a keystone of the Supreme Court's abortion decisions from the 
beginning. 
Any potential "harrassment" that a woman who is dead set 
on obtaining an abortion might perceive in the counseling re- 
quirement is a trivial burden for her to bear, particularly when 
compared with the enormity of the decision to snuff out unborn 
life. The harassment concern pales even further when one realizes 
that in the long run counseling actually facilitates the full, if 
sometimes painful, exercise of the woman's autonomy along lines 
consistent with her true interests and in ways that can alleviate 
abiding psychological conflicts and substantial 
number of states impose counseling requirements in connection 
with divorce proceedings,279 even though fundamental liberty in- 
terests are at  stake in the decision to obtain a d i v o r ~ e . ~ ~ " I t  is 
- -- - - - - - - - - - - pp 
277. Id. 
278. One of the distressing ironies implicit in the "harassment" rhetoric is that it 
pays lipservice to the value of woman's autonomy without fully respecting it. To charge 
that counseling is ultimately a form of harassment is to overlook the deep need a woman 
facing the abortion choice has of coming to grips with the full implications of her decision. 
More importantly, it underestimates the likelihood that a woman considering an abortion 
might decide, after deeper reflection, to continue her pregnancy. After all, abortion is not 
the inevitable end product of rational, autonomous choice, and the decision to continue a 
pregnancy is not necessarily the consequence of coercion or subtle psychological wizardry. 
Counseling may demand painful self-assessment, but to attempt to shield a woman from 
the imposition of this type of evaluative burden under the guise of protecting her from 
harassment is ultimately to insulate her from assuming the full responsibility for personal 
self-determination. Freedom of choice stripped of such self-confrontation is a hollow 
mockery of genuine autonomy and perhaps the most devious form of paternalism. 
279. See, e.g, UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Am 8 305(b)(2). 
280. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-83 (1971). 
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difficult to see why the state's interests in requiring counseling 
are any less significant or permissible in the abortion context. 
Assuming that the state does not attempt to dictate the orienta- 
tion of the counseling and the ultimate decision to which it leads, 
counseling would appear to be perfectly consonant with the role 
allocated the medical profession by Roe v. Wade. 
Despite the close practical connection between informed con- 
sent and counseling requirements, there are a number of reasons 
for preferring the latter, or a combination of the two. As a practi- 
cal matter, much of the information required for informed con- 
sent declarations may be gathered by someone other than the 
attending physician and glanced at only perfunctorily by the doc- 
tor. Moreover, even if the physician conducts the consent proce- 
dure himself, it is all too likely to degenerate into a Miranda-type 
ritual.2n1 Requiring the doctor to spend a reasonable amount of 
time in a one-on-one encounter with the patient, preferably a day 
or more before the proposed abortion,282 and then to verify that 
the decision to proceed with the abortion was reached only after 
careful joint consideration of all relevant factors, would have a 
number of salutary effects. Contrary to present realities, a re- 
quirement of this nature would assure that genuine doctor- 
patient consultation occurred. More importantly, by placing the 
emphasis on the significance of the personal encounter, much 
could be done to dissolve the woodenness of informed consent 
procedure. Finally, a counseling requirement leaves much greater 
flexibility to the doctor and the patient in developing their rela- 
tionship. Whatever the force of Justice Blackmun's remark about 
straitjacketing the physician in the context of informed consent 
statutes," it is inapplicable with regard to nondirective counsel- 
ing. 
The situation with regard to directive counseling schemes is 
more complex. In part, it depends on what is meant by "directive 
counseling." If the scheme requires only that the counseling di- 
rect the woman's attention to certain facts relevant to her abor- 
tion decision, as in France, the counseling requirement is indis- 
tinguishable in effect from detailed informed consent provisions, 
and should be sustained for the same reasons. On the other hand, 
if those providing the counseling are required to actively attempt 
to dissuade a woman from obtaining an abortion, as in the Ger- 
281. See note 202 and accompanying text supra. 
282. See notes 205-18 and accompanying t ex t  supra. 
283. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976). See notes 196-98 
and accompanying text supra. 
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man system, the scheme is much more questionable. There is a 
major difference between providing information that will contrib- 
ute to the making of a rational and autonomous choice and state 
efforts to determine the content of that choice. A statute requir- 
ing directive counseling in this stronger sense would impose a 
significant burden on the right to seek an abortion. Rather than 
a mere effort to assure that meaningful doctor-patient interaction 
occurred, the requirement would constitute active intervention in 
the decisionmaking process of doctor and patient. It would de- 
mean rather than respect the woman's autonomy. Accordingly, a 
statute of this nature should be unconstitutional. 
The question whether women can be required to receive 
counseling from parties other than their physicians is probably 
the most difficult from a theoretical perspective. At issue are two 
conflicting values shielded by the woman's privacy right. If the 
stress is placed on nondisclosure of intimate c o n c e r n ~ , ~ ~ h n d  if 
Roe and Danforth stand for the proposition that a t  least within 
the first trimester there is no justification for the incremental 
intrusion into a woman's privacy that would be required if the 
woman was forced to seek counseling from someone other than a 
doctor,2n5 third-party counseling requirements would appear to be 
unconstitutional. On the other hand, if rational autonomy is the 
primary value a t  ~take,~~"here are a number of reasons why a 
nondirective counseling requirement with qualified personnel 
should be permissible. As noted by the constitutional court in 
connection with the German counseling scheme,2n7 doctors may 
be less qualified than trained counselors to provide the informa- 
tion and support that a woman considering an abortion needs. If 
the aim of counseling is expanding the woman's autonomy, re- 
stricting the field of potential counselors to physicians may be 
counterproductive. Since a doctor's time is typically much more 
expensive than the time of a qualified counselor or social worker, 
the doctor requirement is also unattractive for economic reasons. 
In deciding between the conflicting privacy values, one 
should remember that the concern for nondisclosure is artificial 
in the abortion context. In addition to the attending physician, a 
number of satellite medical personnel are invariably involved in 
carrying out abortion procedures. On the whole, the Court has 
been much more concerned about intervention in the abortion 
284. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra. 
285. See notes 87-89 and accompanying text supra. 
286. See notes 28-29, 39-47 and accompanying text supra. 
287. See notes 251-52 and accompanying text supra. 
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choice than about nondis~losure.~~There are thus strong grounds 
for arguing that a third-party counseling requirement should be 
permissible to the extent that it effectively expands the rational 
autonomy of those seeking abortions. As a practical matter, how- 
ever, the tendency of the Court to strike down third-party con- 
straints on the abortion decision2Rg is so pronounced that a third- 
party counseling requirement would probably not be held consti- 
tutional. Moreover, the incremental burden of locating the coun- 
seling agency and attending a counseling session, while insignifi- 
cant when compared with other values involved, might be 
deemed a significant burden on the decision to obtain an abor- 
tion. Under Carey v. Population Services International, 2g0 this 
might be enough to invalidate the third-party scheme. 
While the constitutionality of a mandatory third-party coun- 
seling scheme is somewhat shaky, a mandatory nondirective 
counseling scheme with a third-party option should be permissi- 
ble for the same reasons that an Icelandic-type scheme would 
be.291 Some of the economic advantages of nondoctor counseling 
might be obtained by passing a statute requiring counseling, but 
allowing the woman to receive it in whole or in part from someone 
other than her doctor if she wished. A state might set up free 
counseling centers and require women seeking an abortion to re- 
ceive counseling either from her personal physician or from the 
free counseling center. Even though such a scheme would provide 
obvious financial incentives to obtain counseling at  the free cen- 
ter, it would not be constitutionally objectionable under Maher 
if the counseling requirement itself is permissible.2g2 
One final issue that must be considered in conjunction with 
counseling schemes concerns the qualifications of those providing 
the counseling. At present, there are few standards for abortion 
counselors.293 Since abortion counseling is complex and emo- 
tional, the counseling role should be filled by someone with the 
requisite expertise. This may necessitate a statutory mandate 
288. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 709-10 (1977) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (contending that requiring minors to 
seek parental guidance, thereby requiring disclosure, would be consistent with existing 
case law). 
289. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US. 52,67-75 (1976) (spousal and parental 
consent requirements); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-200 (1973) (hospital committee 
of physician review of attending physician's judgment). 
290. 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 & n.5 (1977). 
291. See notes 264-71 and accompanying text supra. 
292. See generally Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
293. Dauber, Profile of an Abortion Counselor, 6 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECI~VES 185, 186- 
87 (1974). 
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that physicians fulfill this role in the absence of counselors who 
have complied with some type of certification procedure. The 
state might even require that doctors providing such counseling 
be certified themselves. This is not the place to explore the pre- 
cise nature of counseling qualifications or the structure of a certi- 
fication procedure. At some point, however, these issues must be 
faced. 
This Article is written from the perspective of two individu- 
als deeply saddened by the spectacle of mounting abortion rates 
in the United States. We are not insensitive to the issues and 
values of advancing the autonomy of women, and recognize that 
among the myriad abortions being performed, many occur only 
after the deepest kind of soul-searching, in an agony of conscience 
that ultimately cannot be second-guessed by an outsider to the 
decision. But the staggering statistics on the number of abortions 
being performed, with the figures on fetal deaths in many areas 
outracing the figures on live births, compel the conclusion that 
the increment in female autonomy assured by liberalized abor- 
tion laws is being purchased a t  a horrendous price in terms of 
innocent life. We are saddened by this spectacle not only because 
of the terrible toll that is being paid in the coinage of tiny bodies, 
but also because we are conscious of other legal systems in which 
the tragic dilemma of women's rights and fetal life appears to 
have been resolved with greater sensitivity. We are convinced 
that even within the now well-entrenched confines established by 
the Supreme Court's abortion decisions, responsible steps can be 
taken to enhance this country's sensitivity and effectiveness in 
protecting potential life without detracting from the degree of 
autonomy that  has now been guaranteed to women. Without 
embracing Roe u. Wade and its progeny as an ideal solution to 
the abortion dilemma, this Article has attempted to articulate 
avenues of sensitivity that have been left open by the Supreme 
Court-avenues that, if implemented, could effectuate not only 
a net savings in fetal life, but also a significant expansion and 
deepening of the genuine and rational exercise of female auton- 
omy as well. 
